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THE SUPREME COURT’S FACILITATION OF  
WHITE CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM 
Caroline Mala Corbin* 
Doug Jager, a band student of Native-American ancestry, complained about the Christian prayers at 
his Georgia public school’s football games. Rather than address his concerns, the school lectured him on 
Christianity and proposed an alternative that appeared neutral yet would result in the continuation of 
the Christian prayers. In striking down the school’s proposal, Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. understood 
some of the ramifications of state-sponsored Christianity. 
 
Despite Supreme Court rulings limiting Christian invocations at public-school events, government-spon-
sored Christian prayers and Christian symbols remain plentiful in the United States. This proliferation 
of government-sponsored Christianity around the country both reflects and strengthens Christian nation-
alism.  
 
Christian nationalism maintains that the United States is and should be a Christian nation, and Chris-
tian nationalism’s defining characteristic is the belief that religious identity and national identity overlap 
completely. Christian nationalism necessarily implies a hierarchy based on religion, with Christian insid-
ers who are true Americans and non-Christian outsiders who are not. Moreover, studies show that those 
with strong identification with Christian nationalism have more hostile attitudes towards out-groups, 
religious and otherwise. That hostility paves the way for hostile public policy. Consequently, Christian 
nationalism does not simply lead to symbolic exclusion from the community and nation; it may lead to 
actual exclusion. 
 
Thus, as the sociological evidence establishes, the potential harms of government-sponsored Christianity 
are not just offense but also discriminatory attitudes and discriminatory policies. The insight embedded 
in Establishment Clause doctrine that the government should not favor one religion over others is validated 
by contemporary social science. As a result, instead of eviscerating separation of church and state, the 




*  Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., Harvard University; J.D., Columbia 
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of the Tenth Annual Law and Religion Roundtable for their helpful comments, particularly Stephanie Barclay, 
Netta Barak-Corren, Mohammed Fadel, Fred Gedicks, Jessie Hill, Andy Koppelman, and Anna Su. I would 
also like to thank my excellent research assistants Michael Habib and Kaitlyn Mannis and the Alabama Law 
Review team. Finally, thanks to Michael A. Cheah.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 1985, student and marching-band member Doug Jager challenged his 
public high school’s practice of starting its football games with an invocation.1 
Historically, the Georgia public school had invited a Christian minister,2 and 
the prayers were often explicitly Christian.3 Jager, a Native-American who did 
not practice Christianity,4 complained that the Christian invocations violated 
his religious beliefs.5 He also “had had enough of being ridiculed for not bowing 
his head as Jesus was invoked on the public address system.”6 In response, the 
school proposed allowing school clubs to select a student, parent, or school 
staff member to give an invocation instead.7 Under this “equal access” plan, the 
school would not monitor the content.8 In Georgia’s Douglas County School 
District, where most inhabitants were Protestant Christians, such a solution 
would have resulted in overwhelmingly Christian invocations.9 It was this pro-
posal that Judge Johnson of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held violated 
the Establishment Clause in Jager v. Douglas County School District.10 
My contribution to the Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. Centennial Symposium 
makes three points. First, Judge Johnson’s analysis in Jager was spot-on. He was 
right to apply the Lemon test rather than the Marsh test, and he was right to find 
that both the primary purpose and primary effect of the school district’s plan 
was to continue Christian invocations in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Second, I argue that government-sponsored Christianity,11 while always 
troubling under the Establishment Clause, becomes even more so when viewed 
through the lens of this country’s growing Christian nationalism. Christian na-
tionalism is the belief that the United States “has been and should always be 
distinctively Christian in its identity, values, sacred symbols and policies.”12 It 
 
1.  Jager v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 826 (11th Cir. 1989). 
2.  Id. at 826 n.2 (finding that, with a few exceptions, “Protestant Christian clergymen gave every invo-
cation delivered at Douglas County High School games from 1974 to 1986”). 
3.  Id. at 826 (noting that prayers often invoked Jesus Christ or closed with “in Jesus’ name we pray”). 
4.  Id. at 826 & n.3. 
5.  Id. at 826. 
6.  Nat Hentoff, Should God Be Barred from High School Football?, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 1989), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1989/02/25/should-god-be-barred-from-high-schoo 
l-football/974919a7-96e8-4146-b6af-22cfcac4a029/?utm_term=.e717ccb043a5. 
7.  Jager, 862 F.2d at 827. 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. at 831. 
10.  Id. at 829–33. 
11.  As used here, government-sponsored Christianity is when the government sponsors Christian 
prayers, monuments, or practices that are exclusively, or at least almost exclusively, Christian. Whatever the 
outer limits, government-sponsored Christianity includes at least the Christian prayers of Town of Greece v. 
Galloway and the Christian Latin cross of American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n. 
12.  Samuel L. Perry & Andrew L. Whitehead, Christian Nationalism and White Racial Boundaries: Exam-
ining Whites’ Opposition to Interracial Marriage, 38 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1671, 1672 (2015). 
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conceives of religion and government as wholly overlapping rather than sepa-
rate spheres.13 Government-sponsored Christianity both reflects and furthers 
Christian nationalism. 
Growing Christian nationalism is a problem because recent social science 
has found that Christian nationalism is strongly linked to hostility towards out-
groups, and this hostility paves the way for hostile public policy. Consequently, 
Christian nationalism does not simply symbolically exclude some from their 
community and country; it may lead to actual exclusion.14 
The Establishment Clause, as the Supreme Court has long held, bans the 
government from favoring some religions over others.15 This commitment to 
separation of church and state, however, is fading, as the Supreme Court moves 
towards an approach that allows government-sponsored Christianity. Nowhere 
is this more apparent than the Supreme Court’s two most recent Establishment 
Clause decisions. First, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court rejected 
an Establishment Clause challenge to the town’s explicitly Christian legislative 
prayers.16 Second, in American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, the Court held 
that a forty-foot Latin cross, located adjacent to a busy highway intersection in 
Bladensburg, Maryland, and designated as a war memorial to World War I vet-
erans,17 did not violate the Establishment Clause.18 
Yet emerging social science confirms that there was good reason for the 
Establishment Clause ban on preferring one religion over others. Such govern-
ment favoritism does not merely cause offense but embodies and encourages 
Christian nationalism, with its discriminatory attitudes and policies. In other 
words, as James Madison warned in his Memorial and Remonstrance, government-
 
13.  See Joshua Davis, Enforcing Christian Nationalism: Examining the Link Between Group Identity and Punitive 
Attitudes in the United States, 57 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 300, 301 (2018) (“This desire for a government 
that reflects not only the American interest, but the Christian interest as well, leads many to form an ideology 
of what may be called ‘Christian nationalism.’”). 
14.  See infra Part II.B. 
15.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (“[A] 
principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause [is] that government should not prefer one religion to 
another, or religion to irreligion.”); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989) (“Whatever else 
the Establishment Clause may mean . . . it certainly means at the very least that government may not demon-
strate a preference for one particular sect or creed . . . .”); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The 
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially pre-
ferred over another.”). 
16.  572 U.S. 565, 628 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Many prayers contained elaborations of Christian 
doctrine or recitations of scripture. (‘And in the life and death, resurrection and ascension of the Savior Jesus 
Christ, the full extent of your kindness shown to the unworthy is forever demonstrated’); (‘For unto us a 
child is born; unto us a son is given. And the government shall be upon his shoulder . . .’).” (citations omit-
ted)).   
17.  139 S. Ct. 2067, 2077 (2019) (plurality opinion). 
18.  Id. at 2089 (“[W]e conclude that the Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment 
Clause.”). 
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favored religion helps create second-class citizens.19 Accordingly, my third 
point is that the best way to advance Establishment Clause values and the equal-
ity of all Americans, regardless of religious belief, is to eliminate government-
sponsored Christianity, whether it be Christian prayers or Christian symbols. 
Part I examines Judge Johnson’s decision in Jager v. Douglas County School 
District, along with some Establishment Clause basics. Part II explains Christian 
nationalism and argues that government-sponsored Christianity reflects and ex-
acerbates Christian nationalism. In particular, it summarizes the social science 
that finds alignment between Christian nationalism and discriminatory attitudes 
and policies. Part III contends that to help curb Christian nationalism and its 
negative effects, the Court’s move towards allowing government-sponsored 
Christianity ought to be reversed. Such a result is more in keeping with the 
Establishment Clause goal of avoiding a caste system based on religious belief. 
I. JAGER V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Judge Johnson decided Jager v. Douglas County School District in 1989, before 
the Supreme Court had issued either of its two decisions addressing religious 
invocations at public schools.20 Consequently, he was in somewhat uncharted 
territory. The first question Judge Johnson faced was whether to rely on the 
standard Lemon test or the special Marsh test. Second, he then had to apply his 
selected doctrinal test with limited Supreme Court guidance. He made the right 
call at both steps. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman holds that state action that has either the primary purpose 
or the primary effect of promoting religion, especially one religion over all oth-
ers, violates the Establishment Clause.21 Although the Lemon test has fallen out 
of favor with the current Supreme Court,22 it was the controlling Establishment 
 
19.  James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment, in 8 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 295, 302 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (“It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens 
all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.”). 
20.  They include Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 
U.S. 290 (2000). 
21.  403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668 (2002) (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring) (“A central tool in our [Establishment Clause] analysis of cases in this area has been the 
Lemon test. As originally formulated, a statute passed this test only if it had ‘a secular legislative purpose,’ if 
its ‘principal or primary effect’ was one that ‘neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] religion,’ and if it did ‘not 
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ In Agostini v. Felton, we folded the entanglement 
inquiry into the primary effect inquiry.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. 
at 612–13)). 
22.  Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080 (“If the Lemon Court thought that its test would provide a framework 
for all future Establishment Clause decisions, its expectation has not been met. . . . This pattern is a testament 
to the Lemon test’s shortcomings.”); id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court no longer applies 
the old test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.”); id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would take the logical 
next step and overrule the Lemon test in all contexts.”); id. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Lemon was a 
misadventure.”). 
10 CORBIN 833–866.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/20  12:49 PM 
838 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3:833 
Clause doctrine of the day.23 The one exception to it was carved out in Marsh v. 
Chambers.24 In Marsh, the Supreme Court upheld nondenominational prayers 
before legislative sessions largely based upon the originalist argument that since 
the Founders prayed before legislative sessions, they must have thought them 
constitutional, and if they found them constitutional, so should we.25 
First, Judge Johnson correctly rejected applying Marsh to the case before 
him and instead relied on Lemon.26 He found Marsh inappropriate because, un-
like the nondenominational prayers before legislative sessions in Marsh, Chris-
tian prayers before public-school football games do not date to the founding 
era.27 
His decision is consistent with the Supreme Court establishment decisions 
made soon after, where the Court was especially mindful of young people’s 
vulnerability to coercion. Students at school are more susceptible to coercion 
in part because they are more likely to be a captive audience.28 For example, as 
a saxophone player in the school band,29 Doug Jager had no choice but to at-
tend football games. In addition, compared to adults, schoolchildren are more 
impressionable and therefore more easily pressured into participating in reli-
gious exercises.30 
Second, Judge Johnson correctly concluded that the school’s “equal access” 
proposal failed both prongs of the Lemon test. He found that its primary pur-
pose was to continue the practice of Christian prayers.31 The  school articulated 
four goals for its proposed “equal access” invocations: continuing a tradition; 
solemnizing the football game; reminding everyone of the “importance of 
sportsmanship”; and “satisfy[ing] the genuine, good faith wishes [of the] ma-
jority of the citizens of Douglas County to publicly express support for 
 
23.  Jager v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he Lemon test has been 
applied in all cases since its adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers . . . .” (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 
482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987))). 
24.  463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
25.  Id. at 790–91 (“It can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the First Congress 
voted to appoint and to pay a chaplain for each House and also voted to approve the draft of the First 
Amendment for submission to the states, they intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to 
forbid what they had just declared acceptable. . . . [I]t would be incongruous to interpret that Clause as im-
posing more stringent First Amendment limits on the states than the draftsmen imposed on the Federal 
Government.”). 
26.  Jager, 862 F.2d at 829 (“[T]he Lemon test guides this Court’s analysis in the case at bar.”). I leave 
aside the question of whether Marsh was correct in the first place, which it wasn’t. Backward-looking original-
ism is generally the wrong approach when dealing with forward-looking equality issues. 
27.  Id. (“[T]he present case does not lend itself to Marsh’s historical approach because invocations at 
school-sponsored football games were nonexistent when the Constitution was adopted.”). 
28.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000) (noting that school band members 
may be required to attend football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595–96 (1992). 
29.  Hentoff, supra note 6. 
30.  Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311–12; Lee, 505 U.S. at 593–94. 
31.  Jager, 862 F.2d at 830. 
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Protestant Christianity.”32 As Judge Johnson pointed out, the first three goals 
could have been accomplished by Jager’s proposed secular invocation.33 Given 
that the school rejected this option, it was clearly the last goal—promoting 
Protestant Christianity—that drove the school’s proposal. Accordingly, Judge 
Johnson held that the primary purpose of the “equal access plan” was to pro-
mote Christianity.34 
Judge Johnson also concluded that the primary effect of the school’s pro-
posal would be to promote Christianity.35 To be sure, on its face, the equal 
access plan was neutral. Its language did not mention Christianity, and in theory, 
any religious beliefs, or even secular beliefs, could benefit from the school’s 
platform and stamp of approval. Indeed, the current Supreme Court might well 
find it constitutional.36 In many ways, Douglas County’s equal access plan par-
allels the prayer policy in Town of Greece v. Galloway37, another case involving 
almost exclusively Christian prayers. Like the school’s plan, the town’s plan 
provided for facially neutral “equal access”: clergy from every congregation in 
town were welcome (and invited) to preside over the legislative prayers.38 Like 
the school plan, the town said it would not direct the content.39 Like the school 
district, the town was mostly Christian, as were most of the prayers.40 Despite 
this sectarian result, the Supreme Court held the town of Greece’s prayer pro-
gram did not violate the Constitution because it did not explicitly or intention-
ally exclude non-Christians.41 The Court further argued that though the 
exclusively Christian, government-sponsored prayers might offend some, they 
did no actual harm.42 
Rather than emphasizing the formal equality of the school’s plan (anyone 
could be chosen), Judge Johnson emphasized the lack of substantive equality 
 
32.  Id. at 829. 
33.  Id. at 830 (“Since the School District rejected [the Jagers’ proposed secular] compromise even 
though it would have fulfilled the three secular purposes of pregame invocations, it is clear that the School 
District was most interested in the fourth purpose served by the invocations.”). 
      34.    Id.   
35.  Id. at 830–31. 
36.  However, it might not for two reasons. First, the school context might lead the Court to apply a 
different standard. Second, the Court might find that, unlike the town of Greece, the school district did intend 
to exclude non-Christians. The former would be much more likely than the latter, as the Court minimized 
evidence that the town of Greece had intended to exclude non-Christians. For example, even after residents 
complained about years of Christian prayers, the town of Greece did not change its policy. 
37.  572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
38.  Id. at 571–72. Strictly speaking, it did not favor some religions over others on its face. However, if 
the invitations were limited to congregations, then even on its face it favored religious speakers over nonre-
ligious ones. 
39.  Id. at 571. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. at 591–92. 
42.  Id. at 589 (“Adults often encounter speech they find disagreeable; and an Establishment Clause 
violation is not made out any time a person experiences a sense of affront from the expression of contrary 
religious views in a legislative forum . . . .”). 
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(Protestant Christians will be chosen). That is, his analysis focused not on what 
in theory might happen but what in reality would likely happen. And in reality, 
almost all school-sponsored prayers in a district where most people were 
Protestant Christians would be Protestant Christian.43 As Judge Johnson noted, 
the invocations had been Protestant since 1947.44 Thus, allowing the school’s 
plan to proceed would have resulted in school-sponsored Protestant Christian 
prayers. Judge Johnson never questioned whether this was sufficient to violate 
the Establishment Clause.45 It was. State-sponsored prayers that were primarily 
Christian favored Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
Although he did not elaborate on the consequences for Doug Jager of at-
tending a school that welcomed predominantly Christian prayers, Judge John-
son hinted that they would be more than mere offense. In the opinion’s opening 
paragraph, Judge Johnson noted that after Jager told his high school principal 
that the Christian prayers conflicted with his religious beliefs, the principal gra-
tuitously passed along the complaint to Jager’s band director, who then “pro-
ceeded to lecture Doug on Christianity.”46 It was not just that the principal 
failed to keep young Jager’s complaint private but that his band director felt 
comfortable enough to lecture Jager about the superiority of Christianity (over, 
presumably, whatever Jager believed in). 
A profile published in the Washington Post detailed further repercussions for 
the Jagers, none of which can be chalked up to “feeling offended.” The family 
became targets of harassment, suffering slashed car tires and receiving such an 
inundation of threatening phone calls that they installed an answering ma-
chine.47 As studies detailed in the next Part bear out, state-sponsored Christian-
ity results in more than just “offense” to non-Christians. Thus, Judge Johnson 
was right to find the plan unconstitutional. 
II. THE PROMOTION OF CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM 
My second point is that this desire for the government to sponsor Christian 
prayers—or display Christian symbols—reflects Christian nationalism and 
helps perpetuate Christian nationalism. And Christian nationalism is not a good 
development. 
 
43.  Jager, 862 F.2d at 831 (“In addition, Protestant Christianity is the majority religious preference in 
Douglas County.”). 
44.  Id. 
45.  See id. (“[T]he likely result of the equal access plan will be the continuation of Protestant Christian 
invocations, which have been delivered since 1947. Moreover, the equal access plan places those attending 
football games in the position of participating in a group prayer. Consequently, the plan violates the primary 
effect prong of the Lemon test.”). 
46.  Id. at 826. 
47.  Hentoff, supra note 6. Asked whether he was worried about his son’s safety, with “[h]is lip trem-
bling,” Jager’s father responded, “How could he be in danger? He’s among Christians.” Id. 
10 CORBIN 833–866.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/20  12:49 PM 
2020] The Supreme Court’s Facilitation of White Christian Nationalism 841 
A. Christian Nationalism Explained 
What is Christian nationalism? Christian nationalism is the belief that the 
United States has always been, and should always remain, a Christian nation in 
both its culture and government. It envisions a perfect overlap between reli-
gious identity and national identity.48 
Christian nationalists believe that the United States has a special relation-
ship with God49: “[T]he United States is God’s chosen country, a ‘city on a 
hill’ . . . .”50 Because it is a core belief, one of the questions sociologists use to 
measure Christian nationalism is whether the respondent believes that “the suc-
cess of the United States is part of God’s plan.”51 
In order to stay in God’s favor, “the United States must uphold God’s 
commands and not break the covenant.”52 A failure to obey God’s laws—and 
by that Christian nationalists mean God’s laws as they understand them—will 
lead to great national harm.53 Consequently, Christian nationalism requires a 
Christian government to ensure that the United States abides by Christian prin-
ciples. This belief is reflected in the other questions used to measure Christian 
nationalism, namely, asking whether: “the federal government should declare 
the United States a Christian nation”; “the federal government should advocate 
Christian values”; “the federal government should allow the display of religious 
symbols in public spaces”; and—especially pertinent for Jager—whether “the 
federal government should allow prayer in public schools.”54 The more strongly 
people agree (or disagree with the statement “the federal government should 
 
48.  See Andrew L. Whitehead, Samuel L. Perry & Joseph O. Baker, Make America Christian Again: 
Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election, 79 SOC. RELIGION 147, 165 
(2018) (“Christian nationalism is a pervasive set of beliefs and ideals that merge American and Christian group 
memberships . . . .”). 
49.  Eric Leon McDaniel, Irfan Nooruddin & Allyson Faith Shortle, Divine Boundaries: How Religion 
Shapes Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Immigrants, 39 AM. POL. RES. 205, 212 (2011) (“[T]he American nation holds 
a special connection with God and has a central role in the divine plan.”). 
50.  Andrew L. Whitehead & Samuel L. Perry, A More Perfect Union? Christian Nationalism and Support for 
Same-Sex Unions, 58 SOC. PERSP. 422, 425 (2015). 
51.  Id. at 427; see also Davis, supra note 13, at 305; Whitehead, Perry & Baker, supra note 48, at 155. 
52.  Whitehead & Perry, supra note 50, at 425. 
53.  See id. at 423 (defining Christian nationalism as “the belief that (1) God chose the United States 
and (2) the United States must follow God’s commands to flourish”). 
54.  Id. at 427; see also Davis, supra note 13, at 305; Whitehead, Perry & Baker, supra note 48, at 155. The 
last two questions do not mention Christianity in particular. Nonetheless, as we saw in Jager, the introduction 
of facially neutral prayers (or facially neutral religious symbols) is very often equivalent to the introduction of 
Christian prayers. Governments are displaying Latin crosses, not Stars of David (Judaism), or star-and-cres-
cents (Islam), or nine-pointed stars (Bahai), or wheels of dharma (Buddhist), or oms (Hindu), or yin and yang 
(Taoist), etc. See Andrew L. Whitehead, Landon Schnabel & Samuel L. Perry, Gun Control in the Crosshairs: 
Christian Nationalism and Opposition to Stricter Gun Control Law, SOCIUS, July 23, 2018, at 1, 4 n.6 (“[W]e believe 
it would be a stretch to argue that the vast majority of American adults have anything else but Christianity in 
mind when they are asked about whether the federal government should allow the display of religious symbols 
in public spaces, or prayer in public schools, or whether the success of the United States is God’s plan.”). 
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enforce strict separation of church and state”),55 the stronger their alignment 
with Christian nationalism. 
If America is a Christian nation, it follows that true Americans are Chris-
tian.56 “A person who views the United States as a Christian nation will likely 
believe (explicitly or implicitly) that to be a ‘true’ American, one must be Chris-
tian.”57 The corollary is that non-Christians are not real Americans. “[B]y con-
ditioning recognition as an authentic American on adherence to Christian faith, 
the idea of a Christian America tacitly reinforces the moral prestige of the reli-
gious majority, even as it presents Americans of other faiths, or with no formal 
religion, with invisible barriers to symbolic inclusion.”58 In short, Christian na-
tionalism necessarily implies a hierarchy based upon religion, with Christian in-
siders who truly belong and non-Christian outsiders who do not.59 
Notably, this hierarchy is not solely a religious one. Christian nationalism 
has a racial dimension to it,60 so that the mythical Christian America pictured is 
actually a white Christian America.61 In other words, “Christian nation” is usu-
ally understood to mean “white Christian nation.”62 
 
55.  Whitehead & Perry, supra note 50, at 427. 
56.  Jeremy Brooke Straughn & Scott L. Feld, America as a “Christian Nation”? Understanding Religious 
Boundaries of National Identity in the United States, 71 SOC. RELIGION 280, 283 (2010) (“[T]he statement that 
‘America is a Christian nation’ not only posits an intersection between religious and national boundaries; it 
also implies that the boundary between Christians and non-Christians helps regulate the threshold between 
more and less ‘prototypical’ Americans.”). 
57.  Whitehead & Perry, supra note 50, at 424. 
58.  Straughn & Feld, supra note 56, at 281. 
59.  Whitehead, Perry & Baker, supra note 48, at 150 (noting that Christian nationalism is not only 
explicitly Christian but is also “often quite explicitly evangelical, and consequently, impl[ies] the exclusion of 
other religious faiths or cultures”). 
60.  See John Tehranian, Note, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial 
Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 835 (2000). 
61.  Rhys H. Williams, Civil Religion and the Cultural Politics of National Identity in Obama’s America, 52 J. 
FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 239, 243 (2013) (“There has long been a sub rosa association that made ‘white 
Christian American’ the baseline, default cultural understanding of this nation.”). The original racial delinea-
tion was actually a religious one: 
The Africans brought to the American colonies in those years were distinguished from Europeans 
principally on the basis of religion, not color. Instead of a bifurcation between white and black to 
define the Self and the Other, the English called themselves “Christians” while referring to the 
Others—the Africans—as “heathens.” 
Tehranian, supra note 60, at 829–30 (footnote omitted). It switched from religion to race when black slaves 
started converting to Christianity. Id. at 831. “The principal criteria for distinguishing the English from the 
Africans transformed from mutable religious affiliations to immutable differences in skin color. A number of 
states even passed statutes preventing blacks from escaping slavery through conversion to Christianity.” Id. 
62.  As one historian noted, “Christian nationalism has always been connected with whiteness. It has 
always been about [the idea of] America’s founding by white Christians.” Tara Isabella Burton, What One 
Pastor’s Anti-Nike Protest Says About Religion and Nationalism in America, VOX (Sept. 14, 2018, 12:50 PM) (alter-
ation in original) (quoting historian John Fea), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/9/14/17855804/ 
alabama-pastor-nike-protest-nfl-kaepernick-christian-nationalism; see also infra notes 61–74 and accompany-
ing text. 
10 CORBIN 833–866.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/20  12:49 PM 
2020] The Supreme Court’s Facilitation of White Christian Nationalism 843 
This association has a long history.63 “[T]he use of religion as a prime 
mover in the creation of racial divisions is a critical, but frequently overlooked, 
tradition in American history.”64 When American citizenship by naturalization 
was limited to white people,65 the courts66 would use religion to help establish 
race.67 Christians were white;68 non-Christians were not.69 As Nagwa Ibrahim 
notes, “the racial and religious systems of domination defined by Whiteness and 
Christianity overlapped and became intertwined such that a group’s designation 
as an ‘inferior race’ was in part informed by its affiliation to an ‘inferior reli-
gion.’”70 
Sociological studies show that this association continues to this day. One 
empirical study concluded that “for whites, religious heritage is infused with 
racial meaning.”71 The study asked white people about their desire to pass on 
their religious beliefs and practices. It found that “the more whites desire their 
descendants to share the same religious creeds, values, and rituals, the more 
they would prefer that these descendants be themselves white, and thus, reli-
gious heritage is to a large degree equated with whiteness.”72 Consequently, the 
Christian nationalist goal of “‘protect[ing]’ or ‘restor[ing]’ America’s ‘Christian 
heritage’ is laced with an implicit desire to maintain white supremacy and white 
 
63.  Nagwa Ibrahim, Comment, The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & 
NEAR EASTERN L. 121, 124 (2008) (“[F]rom the beginning, the American national community was racially 
constructed as white, whereby a group’s religious affiliation to Christianity was a factor in determining its 
inclusion into Whiteness and the national community.”). 
64.  Tehranian, supra note 60, at 835. 
65.  When Congress passed the first federal law on citizenship, it limited naturalization to white people. 
Leti Volpp, Divesting Citizenship: On Asian American History and the Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 405, 412 (2005) (“The first federal citizenship statute, passed by Congress in 1790, limited naturali-
zation to ‘free white’ aliens.”). The Fourteenth Amendment changed that, but “[u]ntil 1952, only whites and 
blacks could qualify for naturalization.” Tehranian, supra note 60, at 819 (footnote omitted). 
66.  Tehranian, supra note 60, at 819 (“Fifty-two cases were reported between 1878 and 1952. In all of 
these cases, an individual sued to be declared white by law after being denied citizenship rights by immigration 
authorities on the grounds of racial ineligibility.”). 
67.  See id. at 823 (“[A] petitioner could point to the assimilation of his ethnic group into the core 
Western European, Christian tradition as evidence of his whiteness.”). 
68.  Id. at 831 (“Nevertheless, practicing Christianity remained a viable means of performing whiteness, 
with a long history of recognition in American culture and courts.”); see also Khaled A. Beydoun, Faith in 
Whiteness: Free Exercise of Religion as Racial Expression, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (“Whiteness stood 
as the optimal pathway toward naturalized citizenship until 1952. And Christianity . . . often served as the 
most compelling demonstration of whiteness.” (footnote omitted)). 
69.  Cf. id. at 822 (“It may be true that the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common 
ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable 
and profound differences between them . . . .” (quoting United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209 (1923))); 
see also Ibrahim, supra note 63, at 133 (“One determining factor that courts relied on to classify people as non-
white was an applicant’s espousal of and relationship to Islam.”). 
70.  Ibrahim, supra note 63, at 126. Groups that fell on the wrong side of the line at various times 
include Native-Americans, Jews, Irish Catholics, and currently Muslims. Id. at 127, 129, 136; see also Beydoun, 
supra note 68 (“[R]eligion remains a potent catalyst in shaping race and racial classifications today.”). 
71.  Samuel L. Perry, Hoping for a Godly (White) Family: How Desire for Religious Heritage Affects Whites’ 
Attitudes Toward Interracial Marriage, 53 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 202, 216 (2014). 
72.  Id. at 203. 
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racial purity.”73 Not surprisingly, an overwhelming percentage of Christian na-
tionalists are white.74 
Christian nationalism should not be confused with civil religion, which also 
imagines a special relationship between the United States and God. But civil 
religion envisions America’s responsibilities as promoting liberty and justice ra-
ther than Christianity.75 Thus, American “civil religion views the religious and 
political spheres as ‘independent but interconnected’, while Christian national-
ists ‘advocate a total fusion’ between the two spheres.”76 Crucially, too, civil 
religion is not explicitly Christian.77 
Nor should Christian nationalism be confused with personal religiosity, 
which is about “the commitment with which one practices one’s faith,”78 as 
measured by criteria such as church attendance, private prayer, and reading of 
sacred text.79 As opposed to personal religious commitments,80 Christian na-
tionalism focuses on public religious expression81 and intertwined religious and 
national identity.82 
 
73.  Perry & Whitehead, supra note 12, at 1685 (“Christian nationalism contains a distinct ethno-racial 
component. . . .”); see also id. at 1672 (“Scholars point out that Christian nationalist ideology has historically 
[been] highly racialized . . . and some theorize that a resurgence of Christian nationalism in the public sphere 
will likely serve to buttress notions of white purity and systemic non-white exclusion in American social life.”). 
In Penny Edgell & Eric Tranby, Shared Visions? Diversity and Cultural Membership in American Life, 57 SOC. 
PROBS. 175, 177 (2010), Edgell and Tranby found that about a quarter of Americans surveyed qualified as 
“cultural preservationists,” a category that more or less overlaps with Christian nationalists as their “vision is 
distinguished by a commitment to the white Christian cultural heritage that is imagined as still being central 
to American identity.” Id. at 194. In this group, “98 percent [say that the United States] is a Christian nation 
and that it is a good thing, and that the United States is [a] white nation and that is a good thing.” Id. at 190. 
74.  Perry & Whitehead, supra note 12, at 1685 (“The vast majority of Christian nationalists are white 
and likely envision America’s religious heritage through an Anglo-European, Protestant lens.”). 
75.  Whitehead, Perry & Baker, supra note 48, at 150 (describing civil religion as including “a divine 
Creator who promises blessings for the nation for fulfilling its responsibility to defend liberty and justice”). 
76.  Perry & Whitehead, supra note 12, at 1672. 
77.  Whitehead, Perry & Baker, supra note 48, at 150 (“While vaguely connected to Christianity, appeals 
to civil religion rarely refer to Jesus Christ or other explicitly Christian symbols.”); see also Samuel L. Perry, 
Andrew L. Whitehead & Joshua T. Davis, God’s Country in Black and Blue: How Christian Nationalism Shapes 
Americans’ View About Police (Mis)treatment of Blacks, 5 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 130, 131–32 (2019) (“American 
civil religion has often prioritized ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘unity’ as core ideals, and thus can be reimagined to 
transcend ethnoracial boundaries . . . . Christian nationalism, from its inception, has been inextricably linked 
with white supremacy.”). 
78.  McDaniel, Nooruddin & Shortle, supra note 49, at 210. 
79.  Id. at 218; Perry, Whitehead & Davis, supra note 77, at 135–36 (describing the measure of religious 
commitments as including the “frequency of religious service attendance, scripture reading, and prayer”). 
80.  See Evan Stewart, Penny Edgell & Jack Delehanty, The Politics of Religious Prejudice and Tolerance for 
Cultural Others, 59 SOC. Q. 17, 18 (2018). 
81.  Id. (explaining that public religiosity includes the expectation that “religious beliefs [will] be an 
integral part of public life”). 
82.  Id. 
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Christian nationalism is not new.83 Historians disagree about its origins, but 
the current era does not mark its first appearance.84 The idea that the United 
States is a white, Christian nation blessed by God has motivated doctrines like 
manifest destiny85 and policies like the Chinese Exclusion Act.86 
The current version of Christian nationalism arguably has its roots in the 
growth of the Christian right, which prioritizes the enactment of Christian prin-
ciples as opposed to the salvation of Christian souls.87 As Jerry Falwell 
preached, “If a nation or a society lives by divine principles, even though the 
people personally don’t know the One who taught and lived those principles, 
that society will be blessed.”88 
 
83.  Mark Edwards, Ebook Introduction to CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Mark 
T. Edwards ed., 2017) (ebook) (“[W]e should avoid ‘decline and revival’ narratives and understand Christian 
nationalism as a construction . . . that has arisen at various times in various places to accomplish a myriad of 
work.”); Gene Zubovich, The Christian Nationalism of Donald Trump, RELIGION & POL. (July 17, 2018), 
https://religionandpolitics.org/2018/07/17/the-christian-nationalism-of-donald-trump/ (“Christian Na-
tionalism has taken many forms over the years . . . .”). 
84.  See, e.g., Daniel K. Williams, Baptizing Uncle Sam: Tracing the Origins of Christian Nationalism, 44 REV. 
AM. HIST. 391 (2016). In Baptizing Uncle Sam, Williams reviews two books. Id. at 391. Steven K. Green’s 
Inventing a Christian America: The Myth of the Religious Founding suggests Christian Nationalism originated with 
evangelical Christians in the early nineteenth century. Id. In contrast, Kevin M. Kruse’s One Nation Under God: 
How Corporate America Invented Christian America argues it dates back to the New Deal era in the mid-twentieth 
century. Id. at 391–92. Williams himself writes, “Perhaps instead of looking for a single moment when the 
myth of the Christian nation emerged, we should accept the possibility that this mythology has always been 
part of the American fabric.” Id. at 395. 
85.  Jason Wilson, We’re at the End of White Christian America. What Will That Mean?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 
20, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/20/end-of-white-christian-america 
(“This faith informed the 19th-century doctrine of manifest destiny, which held that the spread of white 
settlement over the entire continent was not only inevitable, but just. The dispossession of native peo-
ples . . . was carried out under an imprimatur with Christian roots.”); see also Matthew N. Lyons, Fragmented 
Nationalism: Right-Wing Responses to September 11 in Historical Context, 127 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 377, 
381 (2003) (“Racial nationalism . . . often portrayed the United States as a Christian nation sanctioned by 
God. These themes came together in the nineteenth-century doctrine of Manifest Destiny.”). 
86.  See John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Government, the Academy, and the McCarran-
Walter Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1504 n.106 (1988) (“Although never explicitly acknowledged by the Su-
preme Court, two of the factors that contributed to the enactment of the Chinese exclusion laws of the late 
nineteenth century were concerns about polygamy attributed to the Chinese and the fact that the Chinese 
were not Christians. Both factors were discussed during the Senate debates on the Naturalization Act of 
1870.” (citing CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5155-62 (1870))); John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and 
Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil 
Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55, 57 (1996) (“[T]here was a deep fear of granting [Chinese immigrants] political 
power as they were seen as threatening white Christian hegemony.”); Stephanie Howell, Note, In the Shadow 
of Korematsu: Precedent & Policy Considerations for Trump’s Muslim Registry, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593, 598–
99 (2018) (“Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and later implemented a total ban on immi-
grants from Asia under the Immigration Act of 1924 to ease the growing panic associated with ‘yellow peril’—
a term used to describe the sense of fear that Asian immigrants were out to overtake Christian civilization in 
the United States.” (footnotes omitted)). 
87.  Daniel Hummel, Revivalist Nationalism Since World War II: From “Wake Up, America!” to “Make Amer-
ica Great Again,” 7 RELIGIONS 128 (2016), reprinted in CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 115, 
116 (Mark T. Edwards ed., 2017) (ebook) (“[T]o win divine blessing God cared less about individual souls 
and more about the principles that society was based upon.”). This view contrasts with early evangelicals such 
as Billy Graham who “prioritized individual spiritual regeneration over political actions to bring about social 
reform.” Id. at 118. 
88.  Id. at 125. 
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White Christian nationalism seems ascendant again. Perhaps its resurgence 
was sparked by the election of President Barack Obama, the first African-Amer-
ican President of the United States.89 Perhaps it is a reaction to the demographic 
shift that made white Christians a numerical minority for the first time90 or the 
impending minority status of white Americans. White people, who were 85% 
of the U.S. population in 1965, are predicted to be 46% of the population in 
2065.91 Perhaps it is all of the above and several additional reasons. Whatever 
its cause, many people now openly proclaim their support for Christian nation-
alism.92 
B. Government-Sponsored Christianity and Christian Nationalism 
Government-sponsored Christianity both reflects and exacerbates Chris-
tian nationalism. Christian nationalism maintains that the United States is a 
Christian nation and that the United States government must further Christian 
values.93 It is easy to read the Christian invocations at a public high school event 
as Christian nationalism in practice (never mind a public high school teacher 
lecturing a student on the merits of Christianity).94 Not only do Jager’s predom-
inantly Christian prayers typify the Christian nationalist agenda, but the racial 
dynamics do, as well. Jager was neither Christian nor white. Indeed, that a white 
Christian representative of the state had no qualms about trying to convert to 
Christianity a Native-American under his authority is in some ways a reenact-
ment of America’s history of white Christian supremacy vis-à-vis native peo-
ples.95 
 
89.  Williams, supra note 61, at 253 (“As Barack Obama has literally embodied a disruption of the 
triangle of associations among religion, race, and national identity, these [Christian nationalist] understandings 
of who we are and our special character in the world are at risk.”). 
90.  Wilson, supra note 85. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Certainly, Donald Trump has not been shy about “play[ing] to Christian nationalist sentiments.” 
Whitehead, Perry & Baker, supra note 48, at 151. For example, during a campaign stop at Liberty University, 
Trump told the crowd, “[W]e are going to protect Christianity. . . . Other religions, frankly, they’re banding 
together . . . . We have to band together . . . . Our country has to do that around Christianity.” Id. At a rally 
at Oral Roberts University, Trump claimed, “There is an assault on Christianity. . . . There is an assault on 
everything we stand for, and we’re going to stop the assault.” Id. Another time, “Trump said, ‘Now, in these 
hard times for our country, let us turn again to our Christian heritage to lift up the soul of our nation.’” Id. at 
152. During his campaign, his catchphrase “Make America Great Again” was even set to a Christian hymn. 
Id. at n.2. 
93.  Perry & Whitehead, supra note 12, at 1672 (“Christian nationalism . . . represent[s] a convergence 
of national and religious identities . . . .”). 
94.  Jager v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 826 (11th Cir. 1989). Strictly speaking, the court 
describes Jager getting lectured on Christianity, but it is probably safe to assume that it was not a lecture about 
its shortcomings. See id. 
95.  After dispossessing Native-Americans of their land on the ground that they were not Christian, 
the United States attempted to convert Native-Americans to Christianity. Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Stand-
ards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1309 
(1996) (“Johnson [v. M’Intosh] authorized the removal of Native Americans from their homelands, with its 
10 CORBIN 833–866.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/20  12:49 PM 
2020] The Supreme Court’s Facilitation of White Christian Nationalism 847 
Christian prayers at public-school football games are merely one manifes-
tation of Christian nationalism. While official religious invocations at public 
schools were curtailed by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lee v. Weisman96 and 
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,97 Christian prayers at school-board 
meetings and other local political meetings have proliferated,98 as well as other 
attempts to reintroduce government-sponsored Christianity into public schools 
and the wider community.99 Some states have sought to require that a Bible 
study class be made available in all public high schools.100 Kentucky, for exam-
ple, now offers classes that “explore the Bible’s relevance to contemporary so-
ciety and culture.”101 Other states have passed laws mandating that “In God We 
 
underlying premise being the subjugation of so-called heathen peoples for the sake of civilization and Chris-
tianity.”); id. at 1308 (“Historically, the government explicitly endorsed and attempted to impose Christianity 
upon Native Americans . . . .”); see also Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-
Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 773 
(1997) (“In the late nineteenth century, Native Americans were the subject of a United States government 
Christianization policy that attempted, with the help of Christian churches, to convert Native Americans to 
Christianity by assigning reservations to Christian groups for proselytization purposes and by suppressing 
Native American religious beliefs and practices.”). 
96.  505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
97.  530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
98.  See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 
F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2018) (Christian prayers at school-board meetings); Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 
870 F.3d 494, 497–98 (6th Cir. 2017) (Christian prayers at meetings of the County Board of Commissioners); 
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 2017) (Christian prayers at school-board meet-
ings); Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Mack, No. H-17-881, 2018 WL 6981152, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 
19, 2018) (Christian prayers in the courtroom); Nickell v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:16-cv-
03193-TWP-MPB, 2017 WL 5952899, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 17, 2017) (Christian prayers at school-board 
meetings). 
99.  Indeed, Christianity still appears at public high school football games in the form of coach-led 
prayers after games on the field. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 869 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2017). 
Christianity also appears in the form of Bible verses on football-game banners. See Lauren McGaughy, Court 
Hands Victory to Christian Cheerleaders Who Want Bible Verses on Football Game Banners, DALL. MORNING NEWS 
(Aug. 31, 2018, 12:41 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/courts/2018/08/31/texas-court-hands-
christian-cheerleaders-big-victory-fight-display-bible-verses-football-games; see also, e.g., Freedom From Reli-
gion Found., Inc. v. Concord Cmty. Sch., 885 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 2018) (allowing a nativity scene in a 
school’s “Christmas Spectacular”); Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 328 F. Supp. 3d 
1203, 1214–15 (D. Colo. 2018) (finding that a school-sponsored Christian mission trip violated the Estab-
lishment Clause). 
100.  Erin Richards, Bible Classes in Public Schools? Why Christian Lawmakers Are Pushing a Wave of New 
Bills, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2019, 5:45 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2019/01/ 
23/in-god-we-trust-bible-public-school-christian-lawmakers/2614567002/ (noting that six states including 
Florida, Indiana, Missouri, North Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia introduced so-called “Bible Literacy” 
bills). 
101.  Supriya Sridhar, State Ed Board Approves Bible Literacy Standards for Public Schools, LOUISVILLE 
COURIER J. (June 7, 2018, 8:05 AM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2018/06/06/kentucky-
bible-literacy-class-standards-public-schools/677137002/. While the Establishment Clause does not bar 
studying the Bible as part of a literature or world-religions class, these classes will likely be more akin to 
Sunday-school studies. When the ACLU obtained course materials, it “found some classes were being taught 
as devotional study, rather than literature.” Id. For example, students were required “to memorize Bible verses 
[and] were asked ‘What are some promises in the Bible that God gives to everyone who believes in him?’” Id. 
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Trust” be prominently displayed in their public schools.102 In fact, multiple 
states now require that the police, the ultimate incarnation of state power, bear 
the slogan “In God We Trust” on their vehicles.103 Mississippi has even 
changed its official state license plate to a design that prominently features “In 
God We Trust.”104 Some might argue that our national motto, “In God We 
Trust,” does not promote Christianity, as Jews and Muslims also trust in God,  
and that at the very least the motto should be deemed Judeo-Christian.105 But 
liberal Jews usually support separation of church and state, and more conserva-
tive Jews often avoid spelling out God’s name lest it become destroyed or de-
faced.106 Meanwhile, many Muslims prefer the word Allah, which is Arabic for 
God.107 
Government-sponsored Christian symbols also flourish in the United 
States.108 Every year at Christmastime,109 municipalities across the country erect 
a nativity scene, the sacred depiction of the birth of Jesus Christ.110 Texas went 
 
102.  See, e.g., Stephanie Byrne, Florida Law Requires ‘In God We Trust’ to Be Displayed in Public Schools 
Statewide, NBC7 (Aug. 1, 2018, 8:28 PM), https://www.wjhg.com/content/news/Florida-law-requires-In-
God-We-Trust-to-be-displayed-in-public-school-489807851.html; Richards, supra note 100 (noting that in 
2018, six states passed laws requiring schools to post “In God We Trust” and at least nine more introduced 
similar bills in 2019). 
103.  Cf. In God We Trust National Motto, CONG. PRAYER CAUCUS FOUND., https://cpcfoundation.com 
/religious/in-god-we-trust/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (noting that “over 600 cities and counties nationwide 
display the National Motto in their offices, chambers, official seals, and even on the outside of police and 
sheriff’s cruisers”). 
104.  Justin Wise, New Mississippi State License Plate Features Phrase ‘In God We Trust,’ HILL (Jan. 3, 2019, 
10:54 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/423669-new-mississippi-state-license-
plate-features-phrase-in-god-we. 
105.  But cf. ANDREW L. SEIDEL, THE FOUNDING MYTH: WHY CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM IS UN-
AMERICAN 4 (2019) (“‘Judeo-’ is a sop, a fig leaf, tossed about to avoid controversy and complaint. It is 
simply a morsel of inclusion offered to soften the edge of an exclusionary, Christian movement.”). 
106.  See, e.g., Tracey R. Rich, The Name of G-d, JUDAISM 101, http://www.jewfaq.org/name.htm (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2020) (“That is why observant Jews avoid writing a Name of God online: because there is a 
risk that someone else will print it out and deface it.”); see also Ariela Pelaia, The Jewish Spelling of “God” as “G-
d,” LEARN RELIGIONS (June 11, 2018), https://www.learnreligions.com/jewish-spelling-of-god-2076772. 
107.  Jamal Badawi, Who Is Allah?, WHY ISLAM, https://www.whyislam.org/on-faith/who-is-allah/ 
(last visited May 17, 2019) (“The proper terminology used, in Islam, for God is ‘Allah.’”); see also Asma Af-
saruddin, Allah, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Allah (last visited Feb. 
14, 2020) (“Allah is the standard Arabic word for God and is used by . . . Muslims, regardless of their native 
tongue . . . .”). 
108.  But see, e.g., Davies v. L.A. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2016) 
(holding that adding a Latin cross to the county seal violated the Establishment Clause). 
109.  Only Christianity has one of its holy days recognized as an official federal holiday. 
110.  Rebecca S. Markert, Religious Holiday Displays on Public Property, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION 
FOUND. (2008), https://ffrf.org/outreach/item/14019-religious-holiday-displays-on-public-property (“The 
most frequent complaint that FFRF receives during November and December concerns religious displays on 
public property. The majority involve a crèche, or nativity scene, being displayed at a public park, or outside 
or inside a government building.”). Although sometimes local governments will also erect Jewish menorahs 
and even the Kwanzaa Kinara, sometimes they do not. And most include the menorah or secular items to 
ensure the constitutionality of the nativity scene, as suggested by Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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further and enacted a law—the “Merry Christmas” bill—to allow nativity 
scenes in public schools.111 
Meanwhile, in American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n,112 the Supreme 
Court upheld the placement on government property of a forty-foot Latin 
cross, a symbol that has been described as “the principal symbol of Christianity 
around the world;”113 “an inspirational symbol of the crucifixion and resurrec-
tion of Jesus Christ;”114 and “the principal symbol of the Christian religion, re-
calling the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and the redeeming benefits of his passion 
and death.”115 Even the American Legion Court acknowledged the Latin cross as 
“a preeminent Christian symbol.”116 As Justice Ginsburg noted in oral argu-
ment, “People wear crosses . . . to show their devotion to the Christian faith.”117 
In short, as the Fourth Circuit ruled when finding that the Bladensburg cross 
violated the Establishment Clause, “One simply cannot ignore the fact that for 
thousands of years the Latin cross has represented Christianity. Even in the 
memorial context, a Latin cross serves not simply as a generic symbol of death, 
but rather a Christian symbol of the death of Jesus Christ.”118 
Despite this, the Supreme Court held that the Bladensburg Latin cross did 
not violate the Establishment Clause because of its “special significance” as a 
 
111.  Associated Press, Texas Gov. Perry Signs ‘Merry Christmas’ Bill into Law, FOX NEWS (Dec. 21, 2015), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/texas-gov-perry-signs-merry-christmas-bill-into-law. The act provides 
that: 
[A] school district  may display on school property scenes or symbols associated with  traditional 
winter celebrations, including a menorah or a Christmas image such as a nativity scene or Christ-
mas tree, if the display  includes a scene or symbol of: 
  (1) more than one religion; or 
  (2) one religion and at least one secular scene or symbol. 
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 29.920(b) (West 2018). Other states have attempted to follow in Texas’s footsteps. 
David Walls, States Following Texas’ Lead in Protecting Christmas, TEX. VALUES (Dec. 3, 2013), 
https://txvalues.org/2013/12/03/states-following-texas-lead-in-protecting-christmas/ (listing similar pro-
posals in Louisiana, South Carolina, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Georgia, and New Jersey). 
112.  139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089 (2019) (plurality opinion). 
113.  Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 792 (1995) (Souter, J., concur-
ring). 
114.  Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
115.  Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md–Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 874 F.3d 195, 207 (4th Cir. 
2017) (quoting ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 273 (7th Cir. 1996)), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Am. 
Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2067; see also id. (recognizing that the Latin cross “represents with relative clarity and 
simplicity the Christian message of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ, a doctrine at the heart of 
Christianity” (quoting Carpenter v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1996))). In re-
sponse to the claim that the Latin cross is a symbol of death, the Fourth Circuit noted, “While the Latin cross 
may generally serve as a symbol of death and memorialization, it only holds value as a symbol of death and 
resurrection because of its affiliation with the crucifixion of Jesus Christ.” Id.; cf. Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake 
Cty., 4 F.3d 1412, 1418 (7th Cir.1993) (“[W]e are masters of the obvious, and we know that the crucifix is a 
Christian symbol.”). 
116.  Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2074. 
117.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 88–89, Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717); see also Am. 
Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2107 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Christians wear crosses, not as an ecumenical symbol, 
but to proclaim their adherence to Christianity.”). 
118.  Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 207. 
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historic monument linked to World War I119 and commemorating the World 
War I dead.120 Even accepting the Court’s justification, there is no escaping the 
fact that a monumental Christian symbol on public land perfectly embodies the 
Christian nationalism ideal of state-supported Christianity. Indeed, the argu-
ment that the Latin cross should be viewed as no more than the government’s 
memorial honoring patriotic sacrifice accomplishes exactly what Christian na-
tionalism intends: the equivalence of a Christian symbol with patriotic values.121 
Consequently, as the Fourth Circuit found, “any reasonable observer” of the 
Latin-cross monument could easily conclude that the government “either places 
Christianity above other faiths, views being American and Christian as one in 
the same, or both.”122 
Explicitly Christian practices and symbols do not only reflect Christian na-
tionalism, they help perpetuate it as well. In other words, the causation is not 
all one-way—it rarely is. The government, after all, plays a major role in shaping 
social and political norms.123 (Indeed, this role is well recognized in public edu-
cation, where one of the goals of the public-school system is to inculcate values 
in young men and women.)124 Although causation is harder to prove than cor-
relation, social scientists have begun to demonstrate that government policy 
 
119.  More than once, the Court characterized the cross as a symbol of WWI and the sacrifices made 
during that war. See, e.g., Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085 (“[T]he cross had become a symbol closely linked to 
the war.”); id. at 2076 (“Although we do not know precisely why the committee chose the cross, it is unsur-
prising that the committee—and many others commemorating World War I—adopted a symbol so widely 
associated with that wrenching event.” (footnote omitted)); id. (noting “the cross’s widespread resonance as 
a symbol of sacrifice in the war,” i.e., WWI). 
120.  Id. at 2074. The Court added that “there is no evidence of discriminatory intent [against non-
Christians] in the selection of the design of the memorial or the decision of a Maryland commission to main-
tain it.” Id. 
121.  In some ways, this argument is even more strongly aligned with Christian nationalism. The Latin 
cross is no longer one religion’s special symbol; it is the state’s official symbol of honor, respect, and ac-
knowledgment that is to be applied to everyone. 
122.  Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 212. 
123.  Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
1377, 1380 (2001) (“Government inculcates values, defines justice, fairness, and liberty, and shapes behav-
ior.”). 
124.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The 
public school conveys to our young the information and tools required not merely to survive in, but to 
contribute to, civilized society. It also inculcates in tomorrow’s leaders the ‘fundamental values necessary to 
the maintenance of a democratic political system . . . .’ All the while, the public educator nurtures students’ 
social and moral development by transmitting to them an official dogma of ‘community values.’” (citation 
omitted) (first quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979); then quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 
U.S. 853, 864 (1982))); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (“[T]he objectives of 
public education [is] the ‘inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system.’” (quoting Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77) (third alteration in original)). 
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does cause changes in attitudes125 and behavior.126 “[P]olicy changes can 
strongly affect how people perceive groups, [and] who is considered to be part 
of an in- and out-group . . . .”127 
Consequently, while those already drawn to Christian nationalism may push 
government-sponsored Christianity, because causation is not one-way, govern-
ment-sponsored Christianity may also promote Christian nationalism.128 When 
the government supports Christian prayers and Christian symbols, it is also—
whether explicitly or not, and intentionally or not—supporting Christian na-
tionalism, which, at its core, is about a union of the state with Christianity. 
Many, including the Supreme Court, have argued that government-spon-
sored Christianity usually causes no harm, only offense to those easily offended. 
In Jager, dissenting Chief Judge Roney invoked the Supreme Court’s view of 
government prayers as merely “a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely 
held among the people of this country.”129 
In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court essentially held that without proof that 
someone had been coerced into joining the state-sponsored Christian prayers, 
they were not a problem—and certainly not a constitutional one.130 In fact, the 
Court insinuated that the non-Christian respondents were thin-skinned whin-
 
125.  See, e.g., Tarik Abou-Chadi & Ryan Finnigan, Rights for Same-Sex Couples and Public Attitudes Towards 
Gays and Lesbians in Europe, 52 COMP. POL. STUD. 868, 870 (2019) (“We find that the introduction of same-
sex marriage leads to significantly more positive attitudes toward homosexuality, whereas passing a constitu-
tional ban on same-sex marriage leads to significantly more negative attitudes.”); Katerina Linos & Kimberly 
Twist, The Supreme Court, the Media, and Public Opinion: Comparing Experimental and Observational Methods, 45 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 223, 247 (2016) (“We find that the American public takes cues from the Supreme Court, which 
can result in increased support for controversial laws that have been upheld by the Court.”). 
126.  See, e.g., Rene ́ D. Flores, Do Anti-Immigrant Laws Shape Public Sentiment? A Study of Arizona’s SB 
1070 Using Twitter Data, 123 AM. J. SOC. 333, 335 (2017) (finding that the passage of an anti-immigrant law in 
Arizona led to more anti-immigrant tweets from Arizonans on Twitter); Margaret E. Tankard & Elizabeth 
Levy Paluck, The Effect of a Supreme Court Decision Regarding Gay Marriage on Social Norms and Personal Attitudes, 
28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1334, 1341–42 (2017) (finding that Supreme Court decisions changed people’s perception 
of social norms and noting that “individuals often use their perceptions of what is common or accepted in a 
collective as a guide for their own behavior”). 
127.  Abou-Chadi & Finnigan, supra note 125, at 873; see also id. at 888 (“[C]hanges in policies can 
indeed lead to changes in attitudes . . . .”). 
128.  Note that I am not arguing that everyone who supports public religiosity self-identifies as a Chris-
tian nationalist. They may subscribe to the beliefs but not use the term. Or they may not agree with all 
Christian-nationalist beliefs, though supporting government-sponsored prayers and symbols is a core one. 
129.  See Jager v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 836 (11th Cir. 1989) (Roney, C.J., dissenting) 
(quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)). 
130.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 589 (2014) (“Offense, however, does not equate to 
coercion.”). The Supreme Court also required that state-sponsored prayers neither proselytize nor denigrate 
other religions. Id. at 585 (“Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an 
impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a prayer will not likely establish 
a constitutional violation.”). However, these limits are mostly empty given the Court’s decision to allow 
Christian prayers. When the government-sponsored prayers are only Christian, they inevitably proselytize 
Christianity, and the Christian view that Jesus is the only path to salvation inherently denigrates other faiths. 
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ers, writing, “Adults often encounter speech they find disagreeable; and an Es-
tablishment Clause violation is not made out any time a person experiences a 
sense of affront from the expression of contrary religious views . . . .”131 
These sentiments are echoed in American Legion. The Court assumed that 
the Latin cross hurts no one and repeatedly mischaracterized the harm as giving 
“offense.”132 Justice Gorsuch’s impatience with people “offended” by this in-
nocuous display is palpable in the opening to his concurrence: “The American 
Humanist Association wants a federal court to order the destruction of a 94[-
]year-old war memorial because its members are offended.”133 Later, he further 
minimized the harm by reducing it to a “dislike” that does not even confer 
standing.134 
The Supreme Court is wrong. If nothing else, government-sponsored 
Christianity creates a caste system based on religion. For the government to 
align itself with one and only one religion is to send a message that (a) there is 
one true religion and (b) adherence to that religion is the approved way be a 
true citizen of the polity.135 Those who do not bow their heads with the gov-
ernment do not belong in the same way (or at all). In short, government-ap-
proved Christian symbols and Christian prayers create an in-group (Christians) 
and an out-group (non-Christians).136 “Those who aren’t Christian—or who 
aren’t the right kind of Christian—can never be full citizens of the country the 
Christian nationalists want to create.”137 
A recent poll reveals how this religion-based hierarchy is not a hypothetical 
but a real problem in the United States: 32%—that is, almost a third—of Amer-
icans said that being a Christian is “very important” to being a true American, 
 
131.  Id. at 589. 
132.  See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“Eighty-
nine years after the dedication of the Cross, respondents filed this lawsuit, claiming that they are offended by 
the sight of the memorial on public land . . . .”). But the respondents did not use the word “offended.” In 
fact, at one point, the Court states, “[t]he AHA is not offended by the sight of the Argonne Cross or the 
Canadian Cross of Sacrifice,” citing respondents’ brief, where the word does not appear. Id. at 2086. 
133.  Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
134.  Id. at 2099–100. Justice Gorsuch also refers to the lower court as “indulg[ing]” the plantiffs, as 
though the lower court were a bad parent spoiling a child who, after all, suffers no harm other than disliking 
a patriotic monument. See id. at 2101. 
135.  Cf. Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 284 (4th Cir. 2017) (“When the state’s representatives 
so emphatically evoke a single religion in nearly every prayer over a period of many years, that faith comes to 
be perceived as the one true faith, not merely of individual prayer-givers, but of government itself.” (quoting 
Lund v. Rowan County, 837 F.3d 407, 434 (4th Cir. 2016) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting), as amended (Sept. 21, 
2016), on reh’g en banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017))). 
136.  Cf. Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State Holidays, and the Con-
struction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1079, 1107 (1995) (“Symbols are an 
important part of the cultural exchange system that, among other things, establishes relationships of hierarchy 
and domination.”). 
137.  MICHELLE GOLDBERG, KINGDOM COMING: THE RISE OF CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM 31 (2006). 
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and another 19% said it was “somewhat important.”138 That over half of Amer-
icans think Christianity is a prerequisite to true citizenship is a rather startling 
conviction for those of us in the United States who are not Christian.139 While 
the government’s expansive sponsorship of Christian prayers and Christian 
symbols cannot be completely blamed for this pinched and exclusionary view 
of American citizenship, neither can government-sponsored Christianity be 
completely absolved. Many factors inform people’s beliefs, and the govern-
ment’s laws, policies, and practices are unquestionably among them.140 
Moreover, this in-group/out-group dichotomy of who truly belongs to the 
polity has concrete consequences.141 “Symbolic boundaries are regularly trans-
lated into social boundaries, and social boundaries influence which groups have 
access to resources and certain civil rights and to which groups these are de-
nied.”142 In plainer terms, these symbolic exclusions lead to actual exclusions. 
People think differently about out-groups.143 In fact, a growing body of 
social-science literature has found that those with strong identification with 
Christian nationalism have more hostile attitudes towards out-groups, religious 
and otherwise.144 “Christian nationalism is also a powerful predictor of intoler-
ance toward various out-groups . . . .”145 In one study, those who supported 
public religiosity146—a hallmark of Christian nationalism—were more preju-
diced, even controlling for a range of demographic and ideological factors.147 
 
138.  BRUCE STOKES, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHAT IT TAKES TO TRULY BE ‘ONE OF US’ 33 (2017), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/02/01/what-it-takes-to-truly-be-one-of-us/; see also PUB. 
RELIGION RESEARCH INST., PRRI/RNS JUNE 2015 SURVEY 3–4 (2015), https://www.prri.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/06/June-PRRI-RNS-Religion-News-Survey-Topline.pdf (responding to the same question, 
33% answered being Christian was “very important” to being “truly American” and 20% answered it was 
“somewhat important”). 
139.  In addition, 55% of people surveyed by the American Mosaic Project also responded either that 
“America is a Christian nation and that is a good thing or that [America] is not a Christian nation and that is 
a bad thing.” Penny Edgell, An Agenda for Research on American Religion in Light of the 2016 Election, 78 SOC. 
RELIGION 1, 6 (2017). 
140.  See Martha Minow, Religious Exemptions, Stating Culture: Foreword to Religious Accommodation in 
the Age of Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 453, 456 (2015) (“[T]he government inevitably shapes cultural 
values . . . .”). 
141.  See Straughn & Feld, supra note 56, at 283 (“Even if their immediate effects are largely ‘imagined,’ 
symbolic boundaries can also have material consequences, serving as ‘an essential medium through which 
people acquire status and monopolize resources.’” (quoting Michèle Lamont & Virág Molnár, The Study of 
Boundaries in the Social Sciences, 28 AM. REV. SOC. 167, 168 (2002))). 
142.  Andrew L. Whitehead & Christopher P. Scheitle, We the (Christian) People: Christianity and American 
Identity from 1996 to 2014, 5 SOC. CURRENTS 157, 169 (2018). 
143.  Cf. Edgell & Tranby, supra note 73, at 177 (“Cultural membership is not formal membership. The 
boundary that marks cultural membership defines insiders and outsiders not in legal or technical terms, but 
rather in terms of authenticity or legitimacy. It separates ‘true’ or ‘good’ or ‘worthy’ members of the commu-
nity from ‘false’ or ‘bad’ or ‘unworthy’ ones.”). 
144.  See e.g., Stewart, Edgell & Delehanty, supra note 80, at 17–18. 
145.  Whitehead, Schnabel & Perry, supra note 54, at 3. 
146.  Stewart, Edgell & Delehanty, supra note 80, at 18 (stating that public religiosity means that people 
“expect religious beliefs to be an integral part of public life and political deliberation”). 
147.  Id. at 18 (“First, preferences for PRE [(public religious expression)] have a significant and unique 
association with prejudicial attitudes toward religious out-groups. Second, preferences for PRE also have a 
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Other studies confirm that Christian nationalists are not only more antagonistic 
to non-Christians, such as Muslims,148 but also more antagonistic to other out-
groups, such as LGBT individuals,149 immigrants,150 and racial minorities.151 For 
example, Christian nationalism is correlated with unwillingness to have one’s 
daughter marry someone who is nonwhite152 and with the belief that blacks are 
more violent than whites.153 This racial hostility dovetails with the white-su-
premacist facet of Christian nationalism discussed earlier.154 “Thus, . . . findings 
suggest that, for many white Americans, the idealized image of a Christian na-
tion implies a nation where racial boundaries are fortified and white-racial her-
itage is protected.”155 
None of this is to say that religiosity drives intolerance. Notably, people 
who rated high on private religiosity, as opposed to the public religiosity favored 
 
significant association with intolerant attitudes toward out-groups in general, even after we control for a range 
of factors . . . .”); see also id. at 26 (listing demographic (e.g., age, gender, race, ethnicity, political conservatism, 
income, education, and region) and ideological controls). In the study, they found that the stronger the sup-
port for public religiosity, the less likely individuals were to agree that religious outsiders such as Muslims, 
Buddhists, or atheists shared their vision of society, and the more unhappy they would be if their children 
married someone belonging to one of these outsider groups. Id. at 26–27. 
148.  Allyson F. Shortle & Ronald Keith Gaddie, Religious Nationalism and Perceptions of Muslims and Islam, 
8 POL. & RELIGION 435, 451 (2015) (“Christian nationalism positively related to intolerant attitudes [toward 
Muslims] more than any other variable in the model, regardless of the population examined.”); see also id. 
(“[W]e can conclude that prejudice against Muslims is largely the result of Christian nationalism.”). 
149.  Whitehead & Perry, supra note 50, at 423 (“Using the concept of Christian nationalism, this study 
highlights how a particular religiopolitical social identity influences attitudes above and beyond the standard 
religion and politics measures. . . . [T]his research clearly shows that Christian nationalism is strongly associ-
ated with intolerance toward same-sex unions, despite some claims that beliefs about the Christian heritage 
of the United States is merely an attempt at creating and maintaining a collective identity.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
150.  McDaniel, Nooruddin & Shortle, supra note 49, at 205 (“Christian nationalism is a robust deter-
minant of immigrant animus, whereas religious affiliation only affects immigrant animus when Christian na-
tionalism is excluded.”); see also id. at 224 (“[I]ncreases in adherence to Christian nationalism increase one’s 
negative attitudes toward immigrants . . . .”). 
151.  Perry & Whitehead, supra note 12, at 1683 (“[G]reater adherence to Christian nationalism . . . is 
strongly associated with whites’ discomfort at the thought of their daughters marrying non-whites, and espe-
cially African Americans.”); cf. GOLDBERG, supra note 137, at 70 (“A 2004 survey by the American Mosaic 
Project at the University of Minnesota found that 48.3 percent of white conservative Christians said they 
would disapprove if their child wanted to marry a black person, compared with 21.8 percent of white Amer-
icans as a whole.”). 
152.  Perry & Whitehead, supra note 12, at 1683. 
153.  Perry, Whitehead & Davis, supra note 77, at 140 (“Americans who hold more strongly to Christian 
nationalist ideology were more likely to believe that the police treat white and black Americans equally, and 
they are more likely to believe that the police shoot blacks more often than whites because they are more 
violent than whites . . . Moreover, the effects of Christian nationalism hold even when we control for a variety 
of measures for religious and political conservatism . . . .”). 
154.  See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text; see also Perry, Whitehead & Davis, supra note 77, at 
3 (“[W]hite dominance remains at the core of Christian nationalist ideology, and thus, for white Americans, 
adhering to Christian nationalist beliefs still implies the same desire for white racial purity and supremacy.”). 
155.  Perry & Whitehead, supra note 12, at 1684; id. at 1685 (“[O]ur findings demonstrate a clear and 
near-linear association between adherence to Christian nationalism and whites’ disapproval of white/non-
white racial exogamy, even after controlling for political ideology, whites’ desire for religious heritage, their 
friendships with non-white racial groups and other socio-demographic factors.”). 
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by Christian nationalists, did not share these prejudicial attitudes towards out-
groups.156 In other words, “the extent to which Americans expect religion to 
play a role in public life is a key determinant of prejudice toward various out-
groups even while individual religiosity can, under certain circumstances, pro-
mote tolerance.”157 
This antipathy to out-groups was reflected by the community’s treatment 
of Doug Jager and his family. And this hostile reception was not unusual: those 
who challenge government-sponsored Christianity are regularly subjected to 
vitriol and violence.158 It is for this reason that Establishment Clause plaintiffs 
often litigate under fictitious names.159 For Christian nationalists, non-Chris-
tians who oppose a Christian nation are not just outsiders, they are dangerous 
 
156.  Perry, Whitehead & Davis, supra note 77, at 12 (“Americans who were more religious (measured 
in terms of worship attendance, prayer, and sacred text reading) were actually less likely to affirm our race 
and policing measures once we controlled for Christian nationalism.”); Stewart, Edgell & Delehanty, supra 
note 80, at 31 (“Much of the field conceptualizes religiosity by the ‘3 Bs’—belief, belonging, and behavior . . . . 
We find that this conceptualization of private religiosity is not significantly associated with prejudicial views 
toward religious out-groups, net of controls.” (citation omitted)); Whitehead & Perry, supra note 50, at 434 
(“Those who do not perceive a large degree of overlap between their ‘American’ and ‘Christian’ identities are 
much less likely to discriminate toward others, in this case gays and lesbians.”). 
157.  Whitehead, Schnabel & Perry, supra note 54, at 2–3. 
158.  See generally Benjamin P. Edwards, When Fear Rules in Law’s Place: Pseudonymous Litigation as a Response 
to Systemic Intimidation, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 455–67 (2013) (detailing violence towards Establishment 
Clause plaintiffs, including arson, death threats, physical assaults, vandalization, and torture of pets). One 
example is Joann Bell. After Bell complained about Christian prayers at her children’s school, she was threat-
ened and assaulted, and her home was burned to the ground. Id. at 457–58; see also Bell v. Little Axe Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1397 (10th Cir. 1985) (“After initiating this lawsuit, both plaintiffs received 
numerous threatening telephone calls and letters. Their children were called ‘devil-worshippers’ by other 
students and, in one instance, an upside-down cross was hung on Robert McCord’s locker. . . . Joann Bell 
was the victim of a hair pulling incident committed by a school employee and, in September 1981, the Bells’ 
home was destroyed by a fire of suspicious origin.”). Another example is Jessica Ahlquist, a student who, 
after complaining about a Christian prayer mural in her school auditorium, received threats along the lines of 
“your home address posted online i [sic] cant [sic] wait to hear about you getting curb stomped you fucking 
worthless cunt” and “[g]et the fuck out of R.I. you bitch whore. You are nothing more than a sex-toy of a 
slut. Maybe you will gang-banged [sic] before we throw you out of one of our cars. WE WILL GET YOU—
LOOK OUT!” Edwards, supra, at 459–60 (first alteration in original); see also Newdow v. Rio Linda Union 
Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (“It is no accident that today’s 
plaintiffs are known only by aliases; in the United States, in the twenty-first century, members of a religious 
minority suing for their constitutional rights still face genuine danger of harassment or physical abuse.”); cf. 
Ahlquist v. City of Cranston ex rel. Strom, 840 F. Supp. 2d 507, 513, 516 (D.R.I. 2012) (“At the end of the 
meeting, Plaintiff and her companion, who had also spoken out against the Prayer Mural, were escorted from 
the meeting by the police because of concerns for their safety. . . . Plaintiff was subject to frequent taunting 
and threats at school, as well as a virtual on-line hate campaign via Facebook.”). 
159.  In fact, one lawmaker hoped to discourage establishment suits by making it illegal to bring them 
anonymously. Austin Huguelet, ‘An Embarrassment to the State’: Lawmaker Wants Ban on Anonymous Church-and-
State Lawsuits, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Feb. 28, 2019, 11:32 PM), https://www.news-leader.com/ 
story/news/politics/2019/02/28/lawmaker-wants-ban-anonymous-church-state-lawsuits-christians/30172 
37002/. Cases involving anonymous challenges to prayers and religion at school events include: Santa Fe 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (challenging student-led prayers before football 
games); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012) (challenging graduation cere-
monies held in a church); Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2011) (challenging prayer 
before school-board meetings); Doe v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 498 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2007) (challenging 
distribution of Bibles to elementary students on school grounds); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. 
Bd., 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006) (challenging prayer before school-board meetings), on reh’g en banc, 494 F.3d 
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outsiders.160 Christian nationalists “will want to make sure that those who are 
part of the nation will not threaten its values or take it off its intended path.”161 
Once people think differently about members of an out-group, they are 
liable to treat them differently. In addition to being less tolerant of out-groups, 
one study found that people who subscribe to Christian nationalist beliefs were 
more accepting of policies that treated those groups unequally.162 In the sociol-
ogists’ words, “we find real stakes to these symbolic boundary styles.”163 Those 
decreed “outsiders” are more likely to be denied access to material benefits164 
and to be deprived of civil rights.165 For example, take racial minorities. Com-
plementing the studies that find white, Christian nationalists are more hostile 
to people of color,166 a recent study found that Christian nationalists are more 
likely to oppose policies perceived as benefiting minorities (like spending on 
welfare) and to support policies perceived as punishing minorities (like spend-
ing on law enforcement).167 
 
494 (5th Cir. 2007); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605 (8th Cir. 2003) (challenging 
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer at a graduation ceremony); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Ouachita Par., 274 
F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2001) (challenging statute allowing prayer in schools); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2001) (challenging the district’s “Clergy in the Schools” counseling pro-
gram); Does v. Enfield Pub. Sch., 716 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D. Conn. 2010) (challenging graduation ceremonies 
held at church); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Wilson Cty. Sch. Sys., 564 F. Supp. 2d 766 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (challenging 
repeated official endorsement of religion); Doe v. Porter, 188 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) (challenging 
Bible instruction to kindergarten through fifth-grade students); Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 563 F. Supp. 
883 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (challenging the reciting and singing of prayers at school); Doe v. Acton-Boxborough 
Reg’l Sch. Dist., 8 N.E.3d 737 (Mass. 2014) (challenging daily recitation of the pledge of allegiance). 
160.  According to Christian nationalists, the United States, founded as a Christian nation, “ha[s] since 
lost its way, but through political means, the United States could once again hold up its end of the covenant 
by returning to its biblical ideals and bring God’s blessing back on the country.” Whitehead & Perry, supra 
note 50, at 425. 
161.  McDaniel, Nooruddin & Shortle, supra note 49, at 212 (“Individuals seek to protect their most 
salient identities by policing their boundaries against those who might undermine them.”). 
162.  Penny Edgell et al., The Stakes of Symbolic Boundaries, SOC. Q. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 
25) (“The cultural preservationist package of symbolic boundaries not only defines specific insider and out-
sider groups, it also associates with willingness to tolerate material and political inequality.”); see also id. at 26–
27 (“We . . . show that the content of the symbolic boundaries that Americans draw is linked not only to 
differential tolerance of specific racial, religious, and other minority groups, but it is also connected to more 
general preferences for policies that redistribute material resources to address inequality, and to willingness 
to grant civil liberties to unpopular groups.”). 
163.  Id. at 25. 
164.  Kristen P. Williams, Book Review, 32 POL. PSYCHOL. 1089, 1095 (2011) (“How individuals con-
ceive of who belongs determines whether members of the perceived community should receive benefits, and 
thus these conceptions of community and who is considered a ‘true American’ have policy implications.”). 
165.  Stewart, Edgell & Delehanty, supra note 80, at 32 (finding that those who support public religiosity 
“also express a stronger willingness to revoke civil liberties for groups with which they disagree”). 
166.  Joshua T. Davis, Funding God’s Policies, Defending Whiteness: Christian Nationalism and Whites’ Attitudes 
Towards Racially-Coded Government Spending, 42 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 2123, 2137 (2019) (“Numerous studies 
show that white Christian nationalism is linked with overt indicators of white supremacy, including explicit 
xenophobia and racism.”). 
167.  Id. (“[T]he current study unequivocally affirms that white Americans who more strongly adhere 
to Christian nationalist ideology are more likely to oppose spending for policies that are racially-coded to 
benefit minorities (like welfare) and favour spending for policies that are racially-coded to punish minorities 
(law enforcement, border patrol).”). 
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Similarly, the Christian-nationalist hostility towards immigrants168—who 
are often non-Christian, nonwhite, or both169—likewise translates into hostile 
policies. One study found that individuals more aligned with Christian nation-
alism were also more inimical to Muslims and more willing to deny them civil 
rights.170 Consequently, hostility towards immigrants paves the way for hostile 
public policy, like drastically reduced refugee caps171 and the Muslim ban.172 
“The Trump administration’s repeated attempts at instituting various travel 
bans, largely regarded as singling out Muslims, are one example of the symbolic 
being translated to reality.”173 
In fact, numerous studies have shown that “if taken to extremes, symbolic 
boundaries can have [dire] implications, as when restrictive definitions of na-
tionhood serve as a pretext for depriving marginalized citizens of their civil 
 
168.  See McDaniel, Nooruddin & Shortle, supra note 49, at 213 (“Because of the intertwining of religion 
and nationalism, immigration threatens their entire Christian national identity by permitting others to alter 
their exclusive conceptions of what it means to be an American.”); Perry & Whitehead, supra note 12, at 1673 
(“Because Christian nationalists believe that America’s ‘Christian heritage’ should be defended, they tend to 
oppose the immigration of non-Christians (e.g. Muslims), who also tend to be non-white.”). 
169.  According to the Pew Research Center, 76.8% of U.S.-born residents identify as white as opposed 
to 46.1% of foreign-born U.S. residents. Jynnah Radford & Abby Budiman, 2016, Foreign-Born Population in 
the United States Statistical Portrait, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2018), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2018/09/14/ 
facts-on-u-s-immigrants-current-data/. 
170.  Shortle & Gaddie, supra note 148, at 452 (“It is clear from Table 5 that higher agreement with 
Christian nationalism is associated with greater probability of holding unfavorable views of Muslims, and 
with supporting limits to Muslims’ religious freedom.”). 
171.  Zachary Cohen & Elise Labott, Refugee Levels Are Surging Worldwide. Trump Is Slashing the Number 
the US Will Let In, CNN (Sept. 18, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/17/politics/pompeo-
trump-refugee-asylum-levels/index.html (explaining that the Trump Administration has capped the number 
of refugees at 30,000 for 2019, down from the 110,000 that Obama set in 2017). 
172.  Rick Gladstone & Satoshi Sugiyama, Trump’s Travel Ban: How It Works and Who Is Affected, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/world/americas/travel-ban-trump-how-it-
works.html (explaining that the ban “indefinitely suspends the issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas 
to applicants from the Muslim-majority countries Libya, Iran, Somalia, Syria and Yemen—plus North Ko-
rea,” which does not let many citizens travel, and also affects a few officials from Venezuela); Todd Green, 
By Any Other Name: Why the ‘Travel Ban’ Really Is a Muslim Ban, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (July 3, 2018), 
https://religionnews.com/2018/07/03/by-any-other-name-why-the-travel-ban-really-is-a-muslim-ban/; see 
also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018) (“At the heart of plaintiffs’ case is a series of statements 
by the President and his advisers casting doubt on the official objective of the Proclamation. For example, 
while a candidate on the campaign trail, the President published a ‘Statement on Preventing Muslim Immi-
gration’ that called for a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our coun-
try’s representatives can figure out what is going on.’ That statement remained on his campaign website until 
May 2017. Then-candidate Trump also stated that ‘Islam hates us’ and asserted that the United States was 
‘having problems with Muslims coming into the country.’ . . . More recently, on November 29, 2017, the 
President retweeted links to three anti-Muslim propaganda videos.” (citations omitted)). 
173.  Whitehead & Scheitle, supra note 142, at 169; see also Ramsey Dahab & Marisa Omori, Homegrown 
Foreigners: How Christian Nationalism and Nativist Attitudes Impact Muslim Civil Liberties, 42 ETHNIC & RACIAL 
STUD. 1727, 1739 (2019) (“Our findings suggest that Christian nationalism has a significant and negative 
impact on the civil liberties of Muslims, which has also been supported by past sociological research.”); Paul 
Brandeis Raushenbush, New Religious Landscape Survey Explains a Lot About the Politics of White Christian Nation-
alism, AUBURN, https://auburnseminary.org/voices/new-religious-landscape-survey-explains-lot-politics-
white-christian-nationalism/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (“As many have noted, Trump’s ‘Make America Great 
Again’ slogan, is being translated policy wise into: Make America White (and Christian) Again.”). 
10 CORBIN 833–866.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/20  12:49 PM 
858 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:3:833 
rights or denying citizenship to outsiders on the basis of race, religion, or na-
tional origin.”174 A European study particularly on point found that the more 
robust the government’s sponsorship of Christianity, the more hostile citizens 
were to Muslim immigrants, and the more willing they were to limit the civil 
rights of Muslim immigrants in their communities.175 
In sum, government-sponsored Christianity divides the entire community 
into insiders and outsiders, with all the negative consequences that result.176 
That is, it does not simply lead to symbolic exclusion from the community and 
nation; it may lead to actual exclusion.177 By embracing the overlap between 
Christianity and government and the equivalence of Christianity and citizen-
ship, government-sponsored Christianity bolsters and empowers Christian na-
tionalism. 
III. END GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CHRISTIANITY 
The Establishment Clause prohibits (or used to prohibit) the government 
from favoring one religion over others for very specific reasons. A principal 
one is to ensure that the government does not create religious outsiders who 
are denied equal citizenship or equal access to benefits, services, and power. Put 
another way, the Establishment Clause operates as an Equal Protection Clause 
for religious minorities178 and is meant to ensure that no one is treated as a 
second-class citizen because of their religious beliefs.179 
 
174.  Straughn & Feld, supra note 56, at 284; see also Dahab & Omori, supra note 173, at 1736–37 
(“Respondents who identified Christianity as a crucial aspect of being ‘truly’ American are more significantly 
likely to support the free-speech infringements of Muslims, atheists, communists . . . than those who es-
chewed Christianity as a crucial aspect of national identity.”). 
175.  See generally Marc Helbling & Richard Traunmüller, How State Support of Religion Shapes Attitudes 
Toward Muslim Immigrants: New Evidence from a Sub-National Comparison, 49 COMP. POL. STUD. 391 (2016). 
176.  See Whitehead & Scheitle, supra note 142, at 158 (“Social boundaries are ‘objectified forms of 
social differences’ that limit certain groups from obtaining access to resources and other social opportunities. 
Symbolic boundaries precede social boundaries . . . . People are creative in their construction of symbolic 
boundaries, drawing on any multitude of characteristics to designate who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out.’” (quoting 
Michèle Lamont & Virág Molnár, The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences, 28 AM. REV. SOC. 167, 168 
(2002))). 
177.  Dahab & Omori, supra note 173, at 1731 (“[T]he conflation between White, Christian, and Amer-
ican identities suggests a boundary-making praxis that delineates between those provided access to power 
centres and those rebuffed.”); Straughn & Feld, supra note 56, at 283 (“By attributing contrasting degrees of 
social prestige to insiders and outsiders, symbolic boundaries can confer differential access to material bene-
fits and other advantages.”). 
178.  Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and Synthesis of 
Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, 103 (1990) (“[T]he [E]stablishment [C]lause 
has become a de facto substitute for an independent equal protection analysis of the treatment of religious 
minorities by the state . . . .”); Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REV. 347, 
379 (2012) (“[T]he Establishment Clause can be viewed as essentially functioning as an Equal Protection 
Clause for nonbelievers.”). 
179.  See Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and 
the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1132–33 (2006) (“The historical evidence is 
overwhelming that one of the primary purposes of the First Amendment was the protection of minority 
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Yet by fostering Christian nationalism, government-sponsored Christianity 
undermines religious equality. In fact, government-sponsored Christianity helps 
create precisely the religious hierarchy envisioned by Christian nationalists, with 
devout (white) Christians as the true citizen insiders and non-Christians cast as 
the suspicious—if not dangerous—outsiders. Accordingly, government-spon-
sored Christianity should violate the Establishment Clause. Granted, barring 
government-sponsored Christianity may curtail some American traditions, but 
some traditions are not worth saving, especially if they clash with core consti-
tutional values. 
Unfortunately, Establishment Clause doctrine has become increasingly 
open to government-sponsored Christianity. The Supreme Court permitted 
some government-sponsored Christianity in cases from the 1980s, but it at least 
ensured Christianity was not exclusively promoted. Marsh allowed legislative 
prayers in part because they were not Christian but nondenominational.180 Lynch 
v. Donnelly allowed government nativity scenes when they were surrounded by 
secular items.181 Actually, this decision, too, is consistent with Christian nation-
alism, so the Court’s tolerance for favoring Christianity is hardly new. None-
theless, the current Supreme Court has gone even further in allowing 
government Christianity. Town of Greece allowed explicitly Christian legislative 
prayers.182 American Legion allowed the State to erect and maintain explicitly 
Christian monuments.183 The Supreme Court’s evisceration of the Establish-
ment Clause has made possible the Christian-nationalism vision of a pro-Chris-
tian state. Thus, the current Court is moving in the wrong direction, with its 
new doctrine facilitating Christian nationalism more than ever. 
This encouragement of Christian nationalism is completely avoidable. 
There is no need for government-sponsored Christianity; Christian invocations 
are not necessary, and any secular goal can be accomplished by solemn secular 
invocations.184 Nor is there any need for the government to erect tributes high-
lighting the birth (nativity) or death (Latin cross) of Jesus Christ. If the state 
wants to celebrate the secular aspects of Christmas,185 then it can celebrate with 
 
religions through the guarantee that the government would treat all religions alike.”); Steven B. Epstein, Re-
thinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2171 (1996) (“The purpose of the 
Constitution generally, and the Establishment Clause specifically, is to protect minorities from raw majoritar-
ian impulses.”); cf. Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the Spending Power, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 495, 510 (2009) (“[T]he very purpose of . . . the Bill of Rights, is to protect minorities from 
the majority . . . .”). 
180.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1983). 
181.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671, 680 (1984). 
182.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 582 (2014). 
183.  Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090 (2019) (plurality opinion). 
184.  As local governments around the country demonstrate, solemnity can be induced by reciting the 
pledge of allegiance, observing a moment of silence, or even reading part of the U.S. Constitution. 
185.  Given that Christmas is a Christian holiday and Santa Claus is derived from the Christian St. 
Nicholas, the state might want to reconsider celebrating the holiday at all. 
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a secular Santa and reindeer. If the state wants to honor those who died defend-
ing the United States and its ideals of liberty and equality for all, then it can 
honor them with an actual American symbol, such as the American flag or the 
American eagle.186 Unlike symbols of single-faith tradition, which do not speak 
to other religious observers,187 never mind those who live without religion,188 
these symbols would represent American values shared by everyone. 
What about honoring the role of religion in the United States, past and 
present? According to the Supreme Court, government-sponsored Christianity 
is “a recognition of the important role that religion plays in the lives of many 
Americans”189 or “simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held 
among the people of this country.”190 Moreover, the Court has argued there is 
a long tradition of this type of acknowledgment. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
upheld legislative prayers in large part because they date to the founding of the 
country,191 and it affirmed Christian monuments because they are (somehow) 
linked to this tradition.192 
 
186.  An American flag or eagle is certainly a better way to honor the American values of equality and 
liberty than a symbol that has deep significance to only some Americans. 
187.  According to Gallup, in 2017, “6% of the population identifie[d] with a non-Christian faith, in-
cluding Judaism, Islam and others, while 21% of Americans d[id] not have a formal religious identity.” Frank 
Newport, 2017 Update on Americans and Religion, GALLUP (Dec. 22, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/22 
4642/2017-update-americans-religion.aspx. 
188.  According to Gallup, in May 2017, 12% of Americans who were asked, “Do you believe in God?,” 
answered, “No.” Religion, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 
2020). According to the Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life, 10% of Americans do not believe 
in God or a higher power of any kind, and another 23% believe in God but not the God of the Bible. When 
Americans Say They Believe in God, What Do They Mean?, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 25, 2018), http://www.pewforum. 
org/2018/04/25/when-americans-say-they-believe-in-god-what-do-they-mean/; see also Daniel Cox, Way 
More Americans May Be Atheists Than We Thought, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 18, 2017, 11:55 AM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/way-more-americans-may-be-atheists-than-we-thought/ (finding that 
26% of individuals studied “likely do not believe in God”). The numbers are even higher for young adults: 
among millennials born between 1990 and 1996, 16% do not believe in God or a higher power of any kind. 
When Americans Say They Believe in God, What Do They Mean?, supra. Indeed, only 43% of these eighteen- to 
twenty-nine-year-olds believe in God as described in the Bible. Id. 
189.  Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089 (2019) (plurality opinion) (discussing 
the presence and maintenance of a Latin cross on public land). 
190.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (denying a claim that legislative prayers violate the 
Establishment Clause). 
191.  Id. at 788 (“Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid 
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for the practice of opening ses-
sions with prayer has continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”). 
192.  Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2089 (“The [legislative prayer] practice begun by the First Congress 
stands out as an example of respect and tolerance for differing views, an honest endeavor to achieve inclu-
sivity and nondiscrimination, and a recognition of the important role that religion plays in the lives of many 
Americans. Where categories of monuments, symbols, and practices with a longstanding history follow in 
that tradition, they are likewise constitutional.”). Missing from this analysis is how a WWI monument that 
does not date to the country’s founding can be justified on the same grounds as a practice that was upheld 
largely because it did date to the founding. Also missing is any principled way of deciding whether a Christian 
monument, symbol, or practice belongs to this “tradition” or not. 
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Of course, prayers are not an acknowledgement of religion’s importance; 
instead, prayers are religious worship.193 And a Latin cross is more accurately 
viewed as a foundational symbol exclusive to Christianity than an acknowledg-
ment of the role of “beliefs widely held”194 in a country where at least a quarter 
of Americans either identify with a non-Christian faith or no particular faith at 
all.195 
In any event, the acknowledgment justification has an air of pretext, as do 
other proffered secular justifications. (For example, the Court has simultane-
ously asserted that the Bladensburg cross acknowledges the role of religion, 
symbolizes WWI sacrifice,196 and simply is historically important.)197 It is not 
clear why the beginning of high school football games is an appropriate time to 
impart a social-studies lesson about religion in the United States and to do it in 
such an oblique way. Nor is it clear why memorials in a country with such di-
verse religious beliefs should draw from only one faith.198 
If Christianity were not the most significant feature of government-spon-
sored Christian practices and monuments, they probably would not provoke so 
much emotion in the people defending them.199 After all, if the religious com-
ponent was not so important—indeed, overriding—then it would matter less 
(or not at all) if the legislative prayers were replaced or the Latin cross was 
modified or moved. Such actions certainly would not amount to hostility to 
 
193.  That prayers are an inherently religious act should not need a footnote. See generally Marsh, 463 
U.S. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“‘To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making 
the laws,’ is nothing but a religious act.” (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 792 (majority opinion))). 
194.  Id. at 792 (majority opinion). 
195.  According to Gallup, in 2017, “6% of the population identifie[d] with a non-Christian faith, in-
cluding Judaism, Islam and others, while 21% of Americans d[id] not have a formal religious identity.” New-
port, supra note 187. 
196.  Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2076; see also id. at 2089 (“That the cross originated as a Christian symbol 
and retains that meaning in many contexts does not change the fact that the symbol took on an added secular 
meaning when used in World War I memorials.”). 
197.  Id. at 2085 (“And no matter what the original purposes for the erection of a monument, a com-
munity may wish to preserve it for very different reasons, such as . . . historic preservation . . . .”). 
198.  The cross is an especially inapt representation of all religion because “on one widely known 
understanding of Christianity, the cross symbolizes the threat that non-Christians are damned.” Brief of Bap-
tist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Am. Legion, 
139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717). In fact, “[t]he cross divides the world between the saved and the damned.” Id. 
at 12; see also Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Soldiers of all faiths ‘are united by their 
love of country, but they are not united by the cross.’” (quoting Brief for Jewish War Veterans of the United 
States of America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 
17-1717)). 
199.  One could argue that the Supreme Court has failed to properly enforce the Establishment Clause 
for fear that full enforcement would lead to a popular revolt. American Legion’s compromise position—allow 
existing Christian monuments but disallow new ones—seems more pragmatic than principled. See Am. Legion, 
139 S. Ct. at 2085 (“[R]etaining established, religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and practices is quite 
different from erecting or adopting new ones. The passage of time gives rise to a strong presumption of 
constitutionality.”). 
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religion as the Court has claimed.200 In response to this precise point,201 the 
American Legion Court did a little dance: the government’s Latin cross was not 
so religious that it violated the Establishment Clause, but it was sufficiently re-
ligious that any action other than leaving it exactly as it is would demonstrate 
hostility to religion.202 Besides the having-the-Christian-cake-and-eating-it-too 
quality of this claim, it reveals the inescapably religious nature of much govern-
ment-sponsored Christianity. 
The more honest argument is that because these religious exercises are a 
tradition and have lasted for centuries (or almost a century), how bad could they 
be? Put differently, if a Christian practice or monument exists for long enough, 
it is a perfectly fine tradition; it has become part of the culture. That is essentially 
the argument the Town of Greece Court made when it insisted that the Christian 
prayers “must be evaluated against the backdrop of historical practice. As a 
practice that has long endured, legislative prayer has become part of our herit-
age and tradition, part of our expressive idiom . . . .”203 Similarly, in American 
Legion, the Supreme Court argued that “[t]he passage of time gives rise to a 
strong presumption of constitutionality,”204 in part because “[w]ith sufficient 
time, religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and practices can become 
embedded features of a community’s landscape and identity.”205 
Of course, powerful in-groups have enjoyed all kinds of traditions at the 
expense of out-groups.206 The reason some traditions persist is not because eve-
ryone in the community welcomes them but because the powerless are not able 
to end them.207 Those marginalized may have simply failed to convince—or 
calculated that it was pointless to try to convince—the powers that be to stop.208 
 
200.  See infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text (describing how the Court characterizes any attempt 
to remove, move, or modify the Bladensburg cross as hostility to religion); see also id. at 2086 (“[A]n alteration 
like the one entertained by the Fourth Circuit—amputating the arms of the Cross—would be seen by many 
as profoundly disrespectful.” (citation omitted)).  
201.  Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2086 (“One member of the majority below viewed this objection [that 
modifying the cross is hostile and disrespectful] as inconsistent with the claim that the Bladensburg Cross 
serves secular purposes . . . .”). 
202.  See id. at 2087 (“[A] campaign to obliterate items with religious associations may evidence hostility 
to religion even if those religious associations are no longer in the forefront.”). 
203.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 587 (2014). 
204.  Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085. 
205.  Id. at 2084; see also id. at 2083 (“[A] community may preserve such monuments, symbols, and 
practices for the sake of their historical significance or their place in a common cultural heritage.”). 
206.  For example, sexual harassment long prevailed in the workplace not because women did not 
mind it but because they were unable to stop it. 
207.  Cf. Williams, supra note 61, at 254 (“[W]hite Christians . . . have unproblematically worn the man-
tle of American identity and have been the gatekeepers of which other groups could aspire to do likewise.”). 
208.  The #MeToo movement provides a powerful example. To this day, many women do not report 
sexual harassment or assaults because of the risks that come along with speaking out. See, e.g., Cate Luzio, 
MeToo’s Next Frontier: Addressing Backlash After Speaking Up, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2019, 6:23 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cateluzio/2019/04/28/metoos-next-frontier-addressing-backlash-after-
speaking-up/#7d21f09a7529 (“Once you report bad behavior of any kind, women are often shunned and 
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“[T]he quiescence of those opposed . . . may have reflected nothing more than 
their sense of futility in opposing the majority.”209 But surely “what the power-
less must tolerate [should not become] what the law defines as acceptable con-
duct.”210 In other words, the fact that the government has always prayed at the 
beginning of its sessions or that the government has always relied on Christian 
symbols should not excuse a tradition if it undermines core Establishment 
Clause values. And it does: as the social science suggests, government-spon-
sored Christianity is incompatible with religious equality.211 The tradition should 
be jettisoned, no matter how long-standing or embedded in the culture. The 
courts should be remedying an unequal status quo, not cementing it. 
Although the Supreme Court has argued that experiencing state-sponsored 
religion in public inspires understanding and tolerance,212 the evidence is not 
on its side. In fact, one team of sociologists who study public religiosity ulti-
mately concluded that government “endorsements of religion in general may 
not lead to general religious tolerance, but may . . .  be exclusionary for specific 
religious and nonreligious minorities.”213 Accordingly, claims about the unifying 
tendencies of even civic religion are questionable. Rather than fostering toler-
ance, civic religion may merely placate those who are intolerant.214 
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court’s claims,215 eliminating government-
sponsored Christianity does not evidence hostility to religion. First, this argu-
ment conflates Christianity with religion.216 There are dozens of religions that 
 
blackballed. . . . We have a long way to go for people to feel safe raising issues around sexual harassment and 
gender discrimination.”). 
209.  Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 703 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
210.  Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 847 (1991). 
211.  See supra Part II.B; cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”). 
212.  Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Founders of our Re-
public knew the fearsome potential of sectarian religious belief to generate civil dissension and civil strife. 
And they also knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious believers of 
various faiths a toleration—no, an affection—for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to 
the God whom they all worship and seek.”). 
213.  Stewart, Edgell & Delehanty, supra note 80, at 32 (emphasis omitted). In fact, “[c]ontrary to ex-
pectations from the literature on civil religion, we find that support for public religious expression is strongly 
and consistently associated with a distinct and relatively narrow vision of religious belonging in American 
society.” Id. at 16. 
214.  See Whitehead & Perry, supra note 50, at 436 (concluding civic religion’s claim to be “merely an 
attempt at creating and maintaining collective identity and . . . not overtly related to intolerance [is belied by] 
findings [that] suggest that single convergent social identities such as Christian nationalism strongly promote 
intolerance toward same-sex unions” (citation omitted)). 
215.  E.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“[The] 
removal or radical alteration [of the Bladensburg Cross] at this date would be seen by many not as a neutral 
act but as the manifestation of ‘a hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause 
traditions.’” (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment))); id. 
at 2084–85 (“A government that roams the land, tearing down monuments with religious symbolism and 
scrubbing away any reference to the divine will strike many as aggressively hostile to religion.”). 
216.  To use one’s own religion (or race or sex) as the unstated norm for all religion is a hallmark of 
privilege. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Justice Scalia, the Establishment Clause, and Christian Privilege, 15 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 185, 202–06 (2017). 
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are not Christian, and their members are not likely to view the end of govern-
ment-sponsored Christianity as antagonistic to their faith. Second, if it is not 
hostility to Buddhists, Muslims, and Sikhs for the government to have no Bud-
dhist, Muslim, or Sikh prayers or symbols, then it is not hostility to Christians 
for the government to refrain from Christian prayers and symbols. Third, Chris-
tianity, as well as all other religions, are fully protected in forums that are open 
to private speakers.217 This Essay addresses only the government’s prayers and 
displays. 
Finally, the Establishment Clause is meant to protect not only the equality 
of disfavored religions but also the integrity of favored ones.218 In other words, 
another reason to keep church and state separate is to protect religion from the 
harm that inevitably follows their union. This union—one that the Establish-
ment Clause bans (or should ban) and that occurs when the government spon-
sors Christianity—“tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.”219 
For example, characterizing a prayer to God as nothing more than a social-
studies lesson or a reminder to play fair during a football game is insulting to 
religion.220 Likewise, characterizing the Latin cross as primarily a war memorial 
“desacralize[s] the most sacred symbol of Christianity.”221 
As predicted, government-sponsored Christianity and the Christian nation-
alism it embodies may be souring people on Christianity.222 Many Americans, 
 
217.  Thus, the argument that a strict application of the Establishment Clause eliminates religion from 
the public square is unfounded. There is a long line of free-speech cases where the Supreme Court insists 
that any time the government opens a forum for private speech, religious speech is entitled to the fullest free-
speech protection. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119–20 (2001) (holding that 
school facilities must be made available after school hours for a Christian children’s club); Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995) (holding that a printing reimbursement 
for student groups must be made available to a Christian student newspaper); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 295–96 (1993) (holding that school facilities must be made available to 
a church to screen a religiously oriented film series on family values and child-rearing); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that university facilities must be made available to a student religious group). 
218.  See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The third purpose 
of separation and neutrality is to prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by too close an attach-
ment to the organs of government.”). 
219.  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
220.  See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 811 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If upholding the practice requires denial of 
this fact [that prayers are an act of religious worship], I suspect that many supporters of legislative prayer 
would feel that they had been handed a pyrrhic victory.”). 
221.  Brief of Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty, supra note 198, at 2. 
222.  See E.J. Dionne Jr., No Wonder There’s an Exodus from Religion, WASH. POST (May 6, 2018, 6:07 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/no-wonder-theres-an-exodus-from-religion/2018/05/ 
06/4ad8c33a-4feb-11e8-84a0-458a1aa9ac0a_story.html?utm_term=.a19535e785d3 (“In their landmark 2010 
book, ‘American Grace,’ the scholars Robert Putnam and David Campbell found that the rise of the nones 
was driven by the increasing association of organized religion with conservative politics and a lean toward 
the right in the culture wars. . . . And when will those who advertise themselves as religion’s friends realize 
they can do far more damage to faith than all the atheists and agnostics put together?”); Charles Mathewes, 
White Christianity Is in Big Trouble. And It’s Its Own Biggest Threat., WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/12/19/white-christianity-is-in-big-
trouble-and-its-its-own-biggest-threat/?utm_term=.ad9b444f32e6 (“[T]he alliance of white Christians with 
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especially young ones, are abandoning religion, including Christianity223: recent 
surveys find that roughly four in ten young adults are religiously unaffiliated.224 
Among the reasons they turn away is the mix of religion with politics and gov-
ernment.225 In other words, the attempt to unite Christianity with the state and 
that union’s potentially corrupting influence on religion may well drive people 
away.226 As one Christian commentator wrote about young religious people, 
many “reject the label ‘evangelical’ or ‘Christian’ altogether today . . . because 
we don’t want our faith identified with this weird Christian nationalism that’s 
swept the nation.”227 For those who care about Christianity, as opposed to 
Christian nationalism, government-sponsored Christianity is the wrong ap-
proach to take. 
CONCLUSION 
  Government-sponsored Christianity is one manifestation of Christian 
nationalism. As the sociological evidence establishes, the harm of Christian na-
tionalism is not just offense but also discriminatory attitudes and discriminatory 
 
right-wing politics from the 1980s forward . . . has repelled many younger people from religion out of a dis-
taste at seeing religion so eagerly bend the knee to short-term political gain.”). 
223.  See Jack Jenkins, ‘None’ Now as Big as Evangelicals, Catholics in the US, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Mar. 22, 
2019), https://www.ncronline.org/news/people/nones-now-big-evangelicals-catholics-us (reporting that, 
according to the General Social Survey, about 23% of Americans respond “no religion” when asked about 
their religious tradition); Jana Riess, Religion Declining in Importance for Many Americans, Especially for Millennials, 
RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://religionnews.com/2018/12/10/religion-declining-in-impor 
tance-for-many-americans-especially-for-millennials/ (reporting that in 2018, 35% of all Americans were 
“nones” who identify as atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular); cf. Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Church Membership 
Down Sharply in Past Two Decades, GALLUP (Apr. 18, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/248837/church-
membership-down-sharply-past-two-decades.aspx (finding that only 52% of Americans belong to a church, 
synagogue, or mosque). 
224.  ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., EXODUS: WHY AMERICANS ARE LEAVING RELIGION—AND WHY 
THEY’RE UNLIKELY TO COME BACK 3 (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
09/PRRI-RNS-Unaffiliated-Report.pdf (finding that 39% of millennials were religiously unaffiliated); Riess, 
supra note 223 (finding that 43% of Americans aged thirty to forty-four were “nones” in 2018). 
225. “Nones” on the Rise, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/10/09/nones 
-on-the-rise/#what-is-behind-the-growth-of-the-religiously-unaffiliated (“Several leading scholars contend 
that young adults, in particular, have turned away from organized religion because they perceive it as deeply 
entangled with conservative politics and do not want to have any association with it. . . . [T]wo-thirds or more 
of the unaffiliated say that churches and other religious institutions are too concerned with money and power 
(70%) and too involved in politics (67%) . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); see also JONES ET AL., supra note 224, at 
10 (finding that among Americans who are unaffiliated, 66% agree that “religion causes more problems in 
society than it solves”). 
226.  Cf. Paul A. Djupe, Jacob R. Neiheisel & Kimberly H. Conger, Are the Politics of the Christian Right 
Linked to State Rates of the Nonreligious? The Importance of Salient Controversy, 71 POL. RES. Q. 910, 910 (2018) 
(finding that the rate of religious “nones” climbed more in states where the Christian right was active); Mi-
chael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations, 67 AM. 
SOC. REV. 165, 165–66 (2002) (suggesting that the Christian right’s foray into politics was driving people away 
from religion). 
227.  Benjamin Sledge, Christian Nationalism Is on the Rise and a Growing Cancer, MEDIUM (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@benjaminsledge/christian-nationalism-is-on-the-rise-and-a-growing-cancer-9a19b7 
f85dfb. 
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policies. Even if not specifically motivated by Christian nationalism, govern-
ment-sponsored Christianity nonetheless advances the Christian-nationalist be-
lief that true Americans are Christian-Americans. Everyone else simply is not 
accorded the same respect, benefits, or rights. This result is exactly what the 
Establishment Clause aims to prevent. The insight embedded in Establishment 
Clause doctrine that the government should not favor one religion over others 
is borne out by contemporary social science.228 Consequently, instead of evis-
cerating the separation of church and state, the principle ought to be recognized 
as more important than ever. In sum, government-sponsored Christianity like 
the predominantly Christian prayers in Town of Greece or Jager or predominantly 




228.  Or at least this insight was a bedrock Establishment Clause rule until recently. 
